



THE NAVAL ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA

Patron-In-Chief: Her Majesty the Queen
Patron: Her Excellency Ms Quentin Bryce AC, Governor-General of Australia

National President
Mr Les Dwyer

National Secretary
Mr Roger Tozer

Tel: 03 9402 5011
1300 780 054
Fax 03 8677 9719
email nationalsecretary@navalassoc.org.au

Address all mail to:
National Secretary
PO Box 1251
EPPING PLAZA VIC 3076

www.navalassoc.org.au

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Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal
Locked Bag 7765
CANBERRA BUSINESS CENTRE ACT 2610

INQUIRY INTO UNRESOLVED RECOGNITION FOR PAST ACTS OF NAVAL AND MILITARY GALLANTRY AND VALOUR

The members of the Naval Association of Australia are concerned about the perceived lack of recognition of specific acts of gallantry or valour performed by members of the ship's companies of units of the Royal Australian Navy since its formation on 1 March 1901 as the Commonwealth Naval Force prior to be renamed on 10 July 1911. This in particular is relevant to the award of the Victoria Cross.

Ninety six Imperial Victoria Crosses have been awarded to Australians serving in Army and Air Force units of both Australian and Commonwealth armed forces. Two Victoria Crosses for Australia have been awarded since 1991 when the Victoria Cross for Australia was introduced as a part of the Australian Honours system. Both of these awards were to members of an Australian Army unit. Despite being involved in maritime operations of a warlike nature from its beginning in 1901, no acts of conspicuous gallantry or of valour performed by personnel serving in the Royal Australian Navy have been recognised with the award of the Imperial Victoria Cross or the Victoria Cross for Australia.

The Imperial Victoria Cross is awarded for

“... most conspicuous bravery, or some daring or pre-eminent act of valour or self-sacrifice, or extreme devotion to duty in the presence of the enemy”¹.

Some British Empire/Commonwealth and allied Military personnel are eligible for the award. (Eligibility has varied over time). Personnel serving in the Defence Forces of Australia who

¹ Military Honours and Awards, Defence Internet UK Ministry of Defence.

performed an act which could be determined to comply with the criteria for ward of an Imperial Victoria Cross at some time since 1 March 1901 are eligible for the award.

The Victoria Cross for Australia is awarded for;

“...most conspicuous bravery, or some daring or pre-eminent act of valour or self-sacrifice, or extreme devotion to duty in the presence of the enemy or belligerents.”²

Eligibility is limited to Australian military personnel.

As it can be seen, the criteria for the Imperial Victoria Cross and the Victoria Cross for Australia are the same. Therefore the process of considering people for the award is similar.

The lack of any Royal Australian Naval personnel being recognised for most conspicuous bravery, or some daring or pre-eminent act of valour or self sacrifice or extreme devotion to duty in the presence of the enemy since 1 March 1901, is a reflection of the award system in that the individual acts of naval personnel are not so open to evaluation for recognition by the award of the Victoria Cross as are members of the Australian Army and the Royal Australian Air Force. The historical basis for the award puts an emphasis on individual actions against an enemy who is visible to the individual whose nomination is being evaluated. This is relatively easy in an environment normally confronted in the Army and the Air Force where actions by individual members of those forces are much more recognisable against a visible enemy force, even though the final outcome may be defeat.

Naval personnel are more than likely to be involved in a battle which involves the individual being responsible for a part of the overall performance of the weapons system which they man. Should that battle result in the weapons system losing the battle and in the Navy's case, most likely sinking, no particular performance by an individual is as easy to recognise as of a soldier with a personal weapons system or an air force fighter aircraft pilot solely responsible for the actions of his weapons system.

Nine Victoria Crosses were awarded to Australian soldiers serving in the battle at Gallipoli for individual actions but the overall operation did not achieve its objective and the force that was landed there on 25 April 1915, or what was left of it, was withdrawn eight months later. (Extracts from the citations of these soldiers are attached at Annex A³). At the same time an Australian submarine AE2 penetrated the Dardanelles and was the first submarine to enter the Sea of Marmora in WWI. It was sunk after its major weapons had been expended. No lives were lost in the AE1 action in the Sea of Marmora and the submarine's crew were captured by the Turks.

In comparison with the recognition of Army and Air Force valour, personnel from the RAN have had their valour recognised by a George Cross, Victoria Cross equivalent but as has been shown in the Australian War Memorial until February 2011, the George Crosses held by the AWM were not displayed in the Hall of Valour, but tucked away in far less prominent areas. There was one exception, the George Cross awarded to Chief Petty Officer Jonathon Rogers, awarded posthumously as a result of his self sacrifice in helping sailors escape from a messdeck in HMAS *Voyager* after a collision with HMAS Melbourne in February 1964. This George Cross was awarded in peace time but displayed in the Hall of Valour from the time of its donation to the AWM where as those George Crosses awarded for extreme act of valour during WWII were given much lesser prominence by the AWM.

The prime example of naval valour on an individual basis during the Second World War was the mine disposal process where four Australian naval personnel⁴ were involved in the disarming of mines laid in various marine environments. These four were recognised with the award of the

² Australian Commonwealth Gazette No S25, 4 February 1991

³ ANZAC Day Commemoration Committee of Queensland Incorporated

⁴ Lieutenant H.R. Syme GC GM* RANVR, Lieutenant Commander J.S. Mould GC GM RANVR, Lieutenant Commander L.V. Goldsworthy GC DSC DM RANVR, Lieutenant Commander G. Gosse GC RANVR

George Cross, stated to be the equivalent of the Victoria Cross but comes second in order because it was introduced about 74 years after the Imperial Victoria Cross. It was also assessed that the work undertaken by those who were disarming mines both naval and land, was not in the presence of the enemy and therefore was more suited to the criteria for the award of the George Cross. Surely a mine laid in water with poor visibility and with an arming circuit that had not been encountered before represents the presence of the enemy, especially as the job requires the person carrying out the disarmament process to be in physical contact with the mine.

In many ways the amount of valour needed to carry out this process is no less than an action performed in the heat of battle. It is extremely dangerous and requires a person to place themselves within inches of several hundred kilograms of high explosive which might be set off by a mistake in the disarming process.

In the official History of the Royal Australian Navy Herman Gill states;

'In every instance of the award of the George Cross and the George Medal to these RAN recipients, the citation tells of "gallant and undaunted devotion to duty"..."courage, initiative and devotion to duty"..."skill and undaunted devotion to duty. There could be no higher commendation.'⁵

This submission does not seek to alter the awards to the mine disposal personnel. They have been recognised with an award which, whilst officially stated as being equivalent to the Victoria Cross, the recipients have not received anywhere near the same recognition as those who are awarded the Victoria Cross.

The following naval personnel were noted for their self-sacrifice, and extreme devotion to duty in the presence of the enemy.

People remaining at their station

Midshipman Robert Ian Davies

Midshipman Robert Ian Davies, 18, was an Australian-born sailor serving aboard the British battleship HMS *Repulse*. Attacked by Japanese aircraft off the coast of Malaya on December 10, 1941, he was last seen firing at the attackers as his gun position submerged.

Leading Cook Francis Bassett Emms

Leading Cook Francis Bassett Emms, 32, was a cook aboard HMAS *Kara Kara*, a boom defence vessel stationed in Darwin harbour at the time of the Japanese air attack on February 15, 1942. Despite severe wounds, he continued to fire a machinegun at attacking aircraft. He died en route to a hospital ship. His actions were considered comparable to British sailor Jack Mantle, awarded the VC for defending his ship from German air attack in 1940.

Ordinary Seaman Edward Sheean

On 29 November 1942, HMAS *Armidale* set out for an operation to Betano, Timor, along with HMAS *Castlemaine*. The two ships were attacked by Japanese aircraft along the way, and were subsequently late in arriving at their destination, missing a planned rendezvous with HMAS *Kuru*. While returning to Darwin, the pair encountered *Kuru* south of Betano and it was decided by *Castlemaine's* commanding officer—as the senior officer—that *Armidale* and *Kuru* should voyage to Betano. The two ships undertook different routes to Betano, during which both vessels came under aerial assault.

⁵ Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Royal Australian Navy 1942-1945 Herman Gill, page 715

During a subsequent confrontation with thirteen Japanese aircraft on 1 December, *Armidale* was struck by two torpedoes and a bomb, and began to sink; the order to abandon ship was given. After helping to free a life-raft, Sheean was wounded by two bullets. He made his way to the aft Oerlikon 20 mm cannon and began to fire on the Japanese aircraft to protect those in the water. Sheean managed to shoot down one of the Japanese bombers, but was killed when *Armidale* sank. Many of the survivors credited their life to Sheean and he was posthumously Mentioned in Despatches.

Leading Aircrewman Noel Shipp

Leading Aircrewman Noel Shipp, 24, was an Australian sailor attached to the Australian navy helicopter flight in Vietnam, operating with a US helicopter unit. On May 31, 1969, he was a door gunner aboard a US helicopter gunship which came under intense enemy fire. Shipp was observed to continue firing on the enemy position right to the moment of impact which killed all aboard.

The actions of LS Shipp showed determination in continuing firing, in that he did not adopt a posture that might have lessened the effect of impact with the ground. Being in a helicopter however, is not quite like being in a ship in that he had little option but to stay where he was.

Davies and Emms and Sheean's actions compare very favourably with that of Boy Seaman John Cornwell and Leading Seaman Jack Mantle, both of the Royal Navy. That of Leading Aircrewman is somewhat different in that he was flying in a helicopter which crashed. Given That Cornwell was eventually awarded the Victoria Cross. The history of his deeds in relation to the award of the Victoria Cross is much more clearly recorded than the actions of the above three members of the RAN. The records of Cornwell's and Mantle's awards are as follows:

Boy Seaman John Cornwell Royal Navy

On 31 May 1916, HMS *Chester* was scouting ahead of the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron at the Battle of Jutland when the ship turned to investigate gunfire in the distance. At 17:30 hours, the *Chester* soon came under intense fire from four *Kaiserliche Marine* cruisers each her own size which had suddenly emerged out of the haze and increasing funnel smoke of the battlefield. The shielded 5.5-inch gun mounting where Cornwell was serving as a sight-setter was affected by at least four nearby hits. The *Chester's* gun mountings were open backed shields and did not reach the deck. Splinters were thus able to pass under them or enter the open back when shells exploded nearby or behind. All of the gun's crew were killed except Cornwell who, although severely wounded, managed to stand back up, and despite the entire gun crew around him dead or wounded, he remained standing at his post for more than 15 minutes until *Chester* retired from the action with only one main gun still working. *Chester* had received a total of 18 hits, but partial hull armour meant the interior of the ship suffered little serious damage and the ship was never in peril. The situation on deck, however, was dire. Many of the gun crews had lost lower limbs due to splinters passing under the gun shields. British ships report passing the *Chester* to cheers from limbless wounded gun crew laid out on her deck and smoking cigarettes, only to hear that the same crewmen had died a few hours later from blood loss and shock.

After the action, ship medics arrived on deck to find Cornwell the sole survivor at his gun, shards of steel penetrating his chest, looking at the gun sights and still waiting for orders. Being incapable of further action, *Chester* was ordered to the port of Immingham. There Cornwell was transferred to Grimsby General Hospital, although he was clearly dying. He died on the morning of 2 June 1916 before his mother could arrive at the hospital.

Three months later, Captain Robert Lawson of *Chester* described the events to the British Admiralty. Though at first reluctant, the Admiralty eventually decided to recommend

Cornwell for a posthumous Victoria Cross and King George V endorsed it. The recommendation for citation from Admiral David Beatty, reads:

"the instance of devotion to duty by Boy (1st Class) John Travers Cornwell who was mortally wounded early in the action, but nevertheless remained standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders till the end of the action, with the gun's crew dead and wounded around him. He was under 16½ years old. I regret that he has since died, but I recommend his case for special recognition in justice to his memory and as an acknowledgement of the high example set by him."

Jack Cornwell was initially buried in a common grave (Square 126 Grave 323) in Manor Park Cemetery, London, but his body was exhumed on 29 July 1916 and he was reburied with full military honours also in Manor Park Cemetery Square 55 Grave 13. Jack Cornwell's father Eli, who died on 25 October 1916 was buried in the same grave on 31 October 1916 having died from bronchitis during home service with the Royal Defence Corps. The epitaph to Jack Cornwell on his grave monument reads,

**"It is not wealth or ancestry
but honourable conduct and a noble disposition
that maketh men great."**

Leading Seaman Jack Mantle Royal Navy

British harbours were dangerous places at the beginning of the Second World War for they were attractive targets for enemy squadrons based in nearby France. The capitulation of France in mid-1940 had left Britain exposed. Dive bombers singled out one British harbour after another and on 4th July 1940 it was the turn of Portland, where some convoys had assembled. Part of the protecting force was the armed merchant cruiser HMS *Foylebank* and one of its 20 mm rapid-fire pom-pom guns was manned by 23-year-old Leading Seaman Jack Mantle of Wandsworth, London.

Mantle already had a reputation, being at that time one of the few naval gunners on convoy protection duty to have shot down a German raider. He had done this with an old-fashioned Lewis light machine gun while serving on a French ship and for this feat had been Mentioned in Despatches. [London Gazette, 11 July 1940].

On 4th July 1940 he reclined in his gunner's swivel chair and faced the fearful sight of more than 20 Stukas diving at him, firing their machine guns and dropping bombs. His exemplary gallantry under fire was witnessed by *Foylebank's* captain, P.J. Wilson. *Foylebank* was sunk and Jack Mantle lost his life. His VC citation on 3rd September 1940 is brief and poignant.

London Gazette, 3 September 1940], Portland Harbour, England, 4 July 1940, Leading Seaman Jack Foreman Mantle, Royal Navy.

Leading Seaman Jack Mantle was in charge of the Starboard pom-pom gun when HMS *Foylebank* was attacked by enemy aircraft on the 4th of July 1940. Early in the action his left leg was shattered by a bomb, but he stood fast at his gun and went on firing with hand-gear only: for the ship's electric power had failed. Almost at once he was wounded again in many places. Between his bursts of fire he had time to reflect on the grievous injuries of which he was soon to die but his great courage bore him up till the end of the fight, when he fell by the gun he had so valiantly served.

Command of a ship facing overwhelming odds

Lieutenant Commander Rankin Royal Australian Navy

The Battle of Java Sea was over and our few remaining ships were being withdrawn and it was time to hastily leave the area. The convoy was subject to harassment from the air almost continually whilst navigating Sunda Strait and HMAS *Yarra*, although sustaining minor damage was able to usher her charges through intact.

The ship's company were about to 'stand down' from Dawn Action Stations on the morning of 4th March 1942, when flashes were observed on the horizon lit by the rays of the rising sun. Any thought of them being possible signals was soon dispelled by the thundering sound of a large calibre shell passing overhead. The convoy at this time was 285 miles South of Java, yet it became obvious that they had been overtaken by Kondo's Squadron of three Cruisers (***Atago, Takao, and Maya***) and four destroyers.

LCDR Rankin immediately began to lay a smoke screen between his convoy and the enemy, ordering his charges to scatter and proceed independently at best course and speed. Then with a final look over his new command, he called for full power, turned back through the smoke screen and charged the enemy.

It wasn't long before the Jap Cruisers opened fire, but the opening salvoes passed overhead. Now, with the range closing rapidly, Rankin, with the full realisation that his ship had no chance of surviving ordered his guns crews to open fire with their main armament of 4 inch guns, which caused the cruisers to sheer off out of range but not before ***Yarra*** had scored at least one direct hit on the lead Cruiser

The opposing 30 eight inch guns of the Japanese soon found the range and pounded the brave little sloop until she lay stopped and helpless in the water, but her brave fight had at least gained a little time for the convoy to increase its distance from the enemy.

Yarra although still firing had taken, in rapid succession, hits in the sick bay, engine room and the bridge. Soon after these the barrel of X-Gun received a direct hit. Then with the upper deck in a complete shambles, all boats wrecked by shrapnel and splinters and all guns apparently out of action the order "***Abandon Ship!***" was given.

Although A and X guns were out of action, the Captain of B-Gun now found that his mount was still capable of firing. He had two Ordinary Seamen left in his Guns Crew and at the 'abandon ship' he sent them aft to save themselves. Leading Seaman Taylor then loaded his gun and trained it ahead on the leading destroyer, now closing in for the kill. Then he laid his gun and fired. Some of the survivors in the rafts said that he fired two rounds, however, after some answering Japanese gunfire B-Gun did not fire again. It is believed that Leading Seaman Taylor scored a direct hit on the destroyer.

Upon 2 rafts the brave ship's survivors watched the end, marvelling at the amount of punishment she could endure before she finally slid beneath the waves. Of ***Yarra's*** complement of 159 plus 35 survivors from other ships who were taking passage only 34 got away to the Carley Floats. There was no food and very little water as they drifted, burning by day and freezing at night.

The courageous Captain Rankin was killed by an eight inch salvo hitting the Bridge soon after he ordered 'abandon ship'. Leading Seaman Taylor was also killed.

On the evening of the sixth day they were found and taken on board by a Dutch submarine, thus concluding one of the RANs finest actions. There were just 13 survivors.

LCDR Rankin's determination to protect his convoy and his actions which led to HMAS *Yarra* being sunk actions compare very favourably with that of Captain Edward Fegen of the Royal Navy who was awarded a Victoria Cross for defending a convoy.

HMS Jervis Bay

Captain Edward Fegen Royal Navy

He was 49 years old, and an acting captain in the Royal Navy during World War II when the following deed took place for which he was awarded the VC.

On 5 November 1940 in the Atlantic, Captain Fegen, commanding the armed merchantman HMS *Jervis Bay*, was escorting 37 ships of Convoy HX-84, when they were attacked by the German pocket battleship *Admiral Scheer*. Captain Fegen immediately engaged the enemy head-on, thus giving the ships of the convoy time to scatter. Out-gunned and on fire *Jervis Bay* maintained the unequal fight for three hours, although the captain's right arm was shattered and his bridge was shot from under him. He went down with his ship but it was due to him that 31 ships of the convoy escaped including the SS *San Demetrio*.

He was remembered in Winston Churchill's famous broadcast speech on 13 May 1945 "Five years of War",^[1] as having defended Ireland's honour:

"When I think of these days I think also of other episodes and personalities. I do not forget Lieutenant-Commander Esmonde, V.C., D.S.O., Lance-Corporal Kenneally, V.C., Captain Fegen, V.C., and other Irish heroes that I could easily recite, and all bitterness by Britain for the Irish race dies in my heart. I can only pray that in years which I shall not see, the shame will be forgotten and the glories will endure, and that the peoples of the British Isles and of the British Commonwealth of Nations will walk together in mutual comprehension and forgiveness."

Submarines in the Dardanelles and Sea of Marmora

AE2 under the command of L Lieutenant Commander Henry Stoker Royal Navy entered the Sea of Marmora on 25 April 1815 having survived a passage through the Dardanelles. For a "full account of her achievements, Australia had to wait until the armistice released her commander from a long and frequently brutal confinement in Turkish prisons."⁶

***AE2* - Royal Australian Navy**

Lieutenant Commander Henry Stoker Royal Navy

Prior to Anzac Day, 25 April 1915, her part in the operations had been uneventful, but on that day VADM de Robeck, Commander-in-Chief Eastern Mediterranean Fleet, ordered her to attempt a passage through the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmora and there endeavour to block enemy traffic between the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. All previous attempts by submarines to pass through the Straits had failed. Obstructions natural and artificial appeared and had thwarted the most determined attempts. In his report LCDR Stoker commented:

'Having proceeded from the anchorage off Tenedos, I lay at the entrance off the Dardanelles until moonset and about 2:30 am on 25th April entered the Straits at 8 knots. Weather calm and clear. As the order to run amok in the Narrows precluded all possibility of passing through unseen, I decided to travel on the surface as far as possible.'

Searchlights continually swept the Strait but *AE2* continued unmolested until 4:30 am when batteries opened fire from the northern shore. The submarine dived and began her passage through the minefield. Wires continually scraped her sides for the next half hour. Twice she surfaced in the minefield for observation. At 6:00 am she was within two miles of the Narrows submerged to periscope depth. The sea was flat calm. Forts on both sides of the Narrows sighted her and immediately opened heavy fire. Stoker watching through his periscope observed a

⁶ Official History of Australia in the War of 1914 – 1918 W. Jose Page 241

number of ships and decided to attack a small cruiser of the Peik e Shetrek type. His report continued:

'At a range of three to four hundred yards I fired the bow torpedo, ordering 70 yards to avoid a destroyer which was attempting to ram on the port side. As the vessel dived the destroyer passed overhead close, and the torpedo was heard to hit.'

After a brief interval underwater Stoker decided to take a look around.

'As the vessel was rising, she hit bottom and slid up on to the bank to a depth of ten feet, at which depth a considerable portion of the conning tower was above water. Through the periscope I saw that the position was immediately under Fort Anatoli Medjidieh.'

The fort opened fire and for some minutes shells fell on all sides until, efforts to refloat her succeeding, *AE2* slid into the safety of deep water. The relief on board the submarine proved brief and it was not long before *AE2* was again stranded.

'Through the periscope I judged the position to be immediately under Serina Burnu, and I further observed two destroyers, a gunboat, and several small craft standing close off in the Straits firing heavily and a cluster of small boats which I judged to be picking up survivors of the cruiser.'

'As my vessel was lying with inclination down by the bows I went full speed ahead. Shortly afterwards she began to move down the bank, bumped, gathered way and then bumped very heavily. She, however, continued to descend and at 80 feet I dived off the bank. The last bump was calculated to considerably injure the vessel, but as I considered my chief duty was to prove the passage through the Straits possible, I decided to continue.'


Shortly afterwards *AE2* again rose to periscope depth. She was seen to be approaching Nagara Point. On all sides she was surrounded by pursuit craft. Every time she showed her periscope the destroyers tried to ram her and every time she eluded them. At last in an attempt to shake the enemy off Stoker decided to lie on the bottom on the Asiatic shore to await developments.

All day, 25 April, *AE2* lay in 80 feet of water while the searching enemy ships passed and repassed overhead. Once she was hit by a heavy object being trailed along the bottom. At 9:00 pm she rose to the surface to charge batteries. All signs of shipping had vanished.

At 4:00 pm on 26 April, *AE2* proceeded on the surface up the Straits. Stoker commented:

'As soon as light permitted, I observed through periscope, two ships approaching - both men-of-war. Sea was glassy calm and I approached with periscope down. On hoisting periscope I observed ship on line of sight of port tube. I immediately fired but ship altered course and the torpedo missed. I discovered I had fired at the leading ship and found it impossible to bring another tube to bear on second ship (a battleship Barbarossa class) with any chance of success. I therefore did not fire.'

'I continued on course through the Straits, examined the Gallipoli anchorage, found no ship worthy of attack and so proceeded into the Sea of Marmora, which was entered about 9:00 am.'



About 9:30 am *AE2* sighted several ships, but since only six of her eight torpedoes remained Stoker decided not to fire until he was certain his target was a troop transport.

'With this intention I dived close to the foremost ship - a tramp of about 2,000 tons. Passing about 200 yards abeam of her I could see no sign of troops; but as I passed under her stern she ran up colours and opened rifle fire at the periscope. I dived over to the next ship and attacked at 400 yards with starboard beam torpedo. The torpedo failed to hit.'

Half an hour later *AE2* surfaced and spent the rest of the day on the surface, charging batteries and making good defects. Shortly after dark she was attacked by a small anti-submarine vessel and throughout the night of 26/27 April she was attacked on several occasions shortly after surfacing.

At dawn on 27 April she sighted a ship escorted by two destroyers. Evading the escort, she manoeuvred into position at 300 yards but this time the torpedo refused to leave the tube. A destroyer tried to ram, forcing a hurried dive. Nothing else was sighted that day. The following night Stoker rested his crew on the bottom of Artaki Bay. Twice on 28 April she made attacks only to see the torpedoes narrowly miss the target.

'At dawn on 29 April I dived towards Gallipoli and observed a gunboat patrolling ahead of Strait off Eski Farnar Point. Dived under gunboat down Strait, and returned up Strait showing periscope to give the impression that another submarine had come through. Destroyers and torpedo boats came out in pursuit; having led them all up towards Sea of Marmora, I dived back and examined Gallipoli anchorage but found nothing to attack.'

AE2 then proceeded out into the Sea of Marmora pursued by anti-submarine units. She surfaced half an hour later, spotted the gunboat, fired and missed by one yard.

On the same day, off Kara Burnu Point, she met HMS *E14*, the second British submarine to successfully pass through the Dardanelles. A new rendezvous was arranged for 10.00 am the following day.

On the night of 29/30 April, *AE2* lay on the bottom north of Marmora Island. Arriving at the rendezvous at 10:00 am she sighted a torpedo boat approaching at high speed. Stoker commented on subsequent events:

'Dived to avoid torpedo boat; whilst diving sighted smoke in Artaki Bay, so steered south to investigate. About 10:30 the boat's nose suddenly rose and she broke surface about a mile from the torpedo boat. Blew water forward but boat would not dive. Torpedo boat firing very close and ship from Artaki bay, a gunboat was also firing; flooded a forward tank and boat suddenly assumed big inclination down by the bows and dived very rapidly. *AE2* was only fitted with 100 foot depth gauges. This depth was quickly reached and passed. After a considerable descent the boat rose rapidly, passed the 100 foot mark and in spite of efforts to check her broke the surface stern first. Within seconds the engine room was hit and holed in three places. Owing to the inclination down by the bow, it was impossible to see torpedo boat through the periscope and I considered any attempt to ram would be useless. I therefore blew main ballast and ordered all hands on deck. Assisted by LEUT Haggard, I then opened all tanks to flood the sub and went on deck. The boat sank in a few minutes in about 55 fathoms, in approximate position 4 degrees north of Kara Burnu Point at 10:45 am. All hands were picked up by the torpedo boat and no lives lost.'

Thus *AE2*'s game of hide and seek was brought to an end, and her Commanding Officer and crew were on their way to spend the next three-and-a-half years in a Turkish prison camp. Four ratings died in captivity.⁷

In comparison four Victoria Crosses were awarded to Royal Navy submarine Commanding Officers during WWI for penetrating the Dardanelles and subsequent action. Their citations for the award are as follows:

⁷ Official History of Australia in the War of 1914 – 1918 Volume IX, W. Jose Pages 241 -248 edited by Naval History Section, Seapower Centre Canberra

Lieutenant Norman Holbrook Royal Navy

On 13 December 1914 in the Dardanelles, Turkey, he performed a deed for which he was awarded the Victoria Cross:

Lieutenant Holbrook was in command of the submarine *B11*, an old and obsolete craft built in 1905. Notwithstanding the difficulties of a treacherous current in the Straits, he dived under five rows of mines and torpedoed and sank the Turkish battleship *Mesudiye*, which was guarding the mine-field. He then succeeded in bringing the *B11* back to the Mediterranean, in spite of being attacked by gun fire and torpedo boats. When they got back to safety the *B11* had been submerged for 9 hours.

Lieutenant Commander Martin Nasmith Royal Navy

He was 32 years old, and a Lieutenant-Commander in the Royal Navy during World War I, when the following deed took place for which he was awarded the VC.^[2]

During the period 20 May–8 June 1915 in the Sea of Marmara, Dardanelles, Turkey, Lieutenant-Commander Nasmith, in command of H.M. Submarine *E.11*, destroyed one large Turkish gunboat, two transports, one ammunition ship, three store ships and four other vessels including civilian transports and torpedo boats which trying to save drowning men and women of *E11*'s targets. Nasmith and HMS *E11* also tried to destroy a Kızılay (Red Cross of Ottoman Empire) Hospital Ship which carried 700 wounded soldiers from battlefields, but failed.

When he had safely passed the most difficult part of his homeward journey he received information that a cargo of coal was heading towards Istanbul from the Black Sea. Realising that coal was essential for the morale of the besieged city, Nasmith turned back.

When the coal-carrying ship came into sight of the docks, a welcoming committee of municipal grandees soon formed, along with a happy crowd - water, electricity and rail transport had all suffered due to a lack of coal. Hardly had the ship berthed than it mysteriously blew up before the eyes of the astounded crowd. Nasmith successfully slipped out again.

Lieutenant Commander Edward Boyle Royal Navy

Admiralty, 21st May, 1915.

The KING has been graciously pleased to approve of the grant of the Victoria Cross to

Lieutenant-Commander Edward Courtney Boyle, Royal Navy, for the conspicuous act of bravery specified below:

For most conspicuous bravery, in command of Submarine *E. 14*, when he dived his vessel under the enemy minefields and entered the Sea of Marmora on the 27th April, 1915. In spite of great navigational difficulties from strong currents, of the continual neighbourhood of hostile patrols, and of the hourly danger of attack from the enemy, he continued to operate in the narrow waters of the Straits and succeeded in sinking two Turkish gunboats and one large military transport.

In addition to Boyle's VC, Edward Geldard Stanley and Acting Lieutenant Reginald Wilfred Lawrence were both awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and all the ratings were awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.

Lieutenant Commander Geoffrey Saxton Royal Navy

Admiralty, S.W., 24th May, 1919.

The KING has been graciously pleased to approve of the posthumous award of the Victoria Cross to the undermentioned Officers : —

Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Saxton White, R.N.

For most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty as Commanding Officer of H.M. Submarine "E 14" on the 28th of January, 1918.

"E 14" left Mudros on the 27th of January under instructions to force the Narrows and attack the "Goeben," which was reported aground off Nagara Point after being damaged during her sortie from the Dardanelles. The latter vessel was not found and "E 14" turned back. At about 8.45 a.m. on the 28th of January a torpedo was fired from "E 14" at an enemy ship; 11 seconds after the torpedo left the tube a heavy explosion took place, caused all lights to go out, and sprang the fore hatch. Leaking badly the boat was blown to 15 feet, and at once a heavy fire came from the forts, but the hull was not hit. "E 14" then dived and proceeded on her way out.

Soon afterwards the boat became out of control, and as the air supply was nearly exhausted, Lieutenant-Commander White decided to run the risk of proceeding on the surface. Heavy fire was immediately opened from both sides, and, after running the gauntlet for half-an-hour, being steered from below, "E 14" was so badly damaged that Lieutenant-Commander White turned towards the shore in order to give the crew a chance of being saved. He remained on deck the whole time himself until he was killed by a shell.^[1]

Able Seaman Dalmorton Joseph Owendale Rudd

Able Seaman Dalmorton Joseph Owendale Rudd was one of 11 Australian sailors who participated in the attack on Zeebrugge, Belgium, on April 22-23, 1918. A commando raid, this was designed to seal off a canal allowing German submarines access to the sea. Eight VCs were awarded to British participants and Rudd was unsuccessful in the ballot for a VC for his unit. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal but that was taken away for his part in the 1919 mutiny over conditions aboard HMAS Australia. He died in 1963 aged 90.

Whilst the part that AB Rudd had in the operation is not readily apparent, the following extracts from books written on the operation demonstrate the Royal Navy's view on the award of Victoria Crosses where failure to achieve the objective occurred. This emphasises that the Royal Navy was only concerned with recognising the bravery of its own officers and sailors despite what really happened.

"Planned to neutralise the key Belgian ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend, both used by the German Navy as a base for submarines and light shipping, the Raid on Zeebrugge was launched early on the morning of 23 April 1918.

The raid was originally proposed by British First Sea Lord, Sir John Jellicoe, shortly before his abrupt dismissal at the close of 1917 (as a consequence of his ongoing reluctance to back First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Eric Geddes' convoy policy).

Jellicoe gained acceptance of an attack in principle - actually formulated by Dover port commander Sir Roger Keyes - by stating to the cabinet his view that Britain's continuing ability to wage war depended upon blocking the exits from both ports, and thus denying German submarines convenient bases.

Thus the Zeebrugge raid was planned in much secrecy and conducted (in part by a volunteer force) by 75 ships following its formal approval by the British Admiralty in February 1918.

The main force of the attack was to be at Zeebrugge, with a smaller offensive launched against Ostend. In preparation for both however the elderly British cruiser *Vindictive* was used to land 200 troops at the entrance to the Bruges Canal (at the mile-long Zeebrugge mole), in order that they could destroy its formidable shore batteries.

The operation began badly however. The prepared smokescreen to cover the *Vindictive* as it landed its troop contents proved ineffective in the face of unexpected winds.

Under crippling fire the old cruiser moored in the wrong location, its guns effectively out of action. However an old submarine did destroy the mole connecting the bridge to the shore after it exploded containing explosives.

The loss of the *Vindictive's* guns was significant: without their crucial support the shore batteries remained untaken. In turn their sustained fire also disabled a further three ancient British cruisers - *Thetis*, *Iphigenia* and *Intrepid* - packed with concrete and which had moved into the inner harbour, preventing them from halting and scuttling themselves in their correct pre-assigned locations at the narrow entrance to the canal.

If the raid upon Zeebrugge produced initially unclear results, the smaller attack upon Ostend was an unequivocal failure however. Two old cruisers, intended as blockships, failed to reach the harbour entrance. A subsequent attempt made to cripple Ostend similarly failed on 9 May.

Represented at the time as a tremendous British victory by Allied propaganda (with the consequence that its devisor Sir Roger Keyes was ennobled), and by the Germans as a demonstration of their success in holding each port, the Zeebrugge raid did not in reality hinder German operations from either port for more than a few days.

Some 500 British casualties were incurred during the operation (of which approximately 200 were fatalities). A total of eight Victoria Crosses were awarded for the night's action."⁸

Captain H M L Waller would be first on any list of most worthy recipients for the award of the Victoria Cross for his actions as Commanding Officer HMAS *Perth* in the Battle of the Java Sea. Captain Waller with 352 of his Ship's Company was lost in the action against vastly superior Japanese forces. USS *Houston* which fought with *Perth* was also sunk.

"*Perth's* captain Hector Waller was a great and brilliant leader whose deeds in action created a naval legend. His untimely end was a sever blow to the RAN. Paying tribute to Waller, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham said:

"Hector Macdonald Laws Waller will always remain in my mind as one of the very finest types of Australian naval officer. Full of good cheer, with a great sense of humour, undefeated and always burning to get to the enemy, he kept the old ships of his flotilla – the *Stuart*, *Vampire*, *Vendetta*, *Voyager*, *Waterhen* hard at it always. Greatly loved and admired by everyone, his loss in HMAS *Perth* in the Java Sea was a heavy deprivation for the young navy of Australia"..⁹

⁸ War Memoirs: Zeebrugge by W. Wainwright; The Zeebrugge Affair by Captain Alfred Carpenter

⁹ The Royal Australian Navy An Illustrated History, George Odgers page 112

Conclusion


Comparisons with the RN winners and the actions in RAN ships/submarine not recognised by the RN as described above leads the Naval Association to believe that there was a very a strong bias in the Royal Navy at the time that the actions took place. In the cases of Captain H.M.L. Waller and LCDR H.H.G. Stoker RN accurate reports of the actions that warrant awards for valour were not available until peace returned to the countries involved. As can be seen in Annex B¹⁰, the Commonwealth Naval Board which was composed of senior officers of the Royal Navy was very unwilling to have a history of the RAN's activities during WWI, as drafted by its author W. Jose, published. The Naval Board's view according to R. Lamont's research was

“that nothing go in that might hurt the feelings of the British Government, the Admiralty, any Australia politician, Admiral Patey or the US or Japanese Governments.”

As the Admiralty was the authority through which awards for valour were to be channelled, it is strongly felt that there was a bias against any nomination for an Australian to be awarded a Victoria Cross. It is also felt that this reluctance persisted through WWII.

The situation was not helped by the fact that King George V decided in 1919 that awards for WWI actions would be terminated in that year. Similar action was taken in 1952 by Queen Elizabeth II concerning awards for WWII. This action was designed to prevent what is happening now, but in the Naval Association's view it remains a fact that there was a bias against the RAN in the Admiralty during the time that the awards could have been made.

It is recommended that the valour of the personnel serving in the RAN who are named above be recognised with the award of the Victoria Cross..



P.J. Cooke-Russell
National Vice President

Naval Association of Australia

¹⁰ Introduction to the Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 – Volume IX The Royal Australian Navy, Ross Lamont

Australian Victoria Cross Recipient



Corporal Alexander Stewart
Burton

Unit	7th Battalion
Born	20 January 1893 at Kyneton, Victoria
Date of action	9 August 1915
Place	Lone Pine trenches, Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkey
Details	It was during the Turkish counter-attack on the Lone Pine trenches on 9 August that Burton performed the actions for which he was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. The Turks advanced up a sap and blew in a sandbag barricade which Burton, Tubb (also a VC winner) and Dunstan (also a VC winner) quickly re-erected after they had repulsed the attackers. The enemy attacked twice more and destroyed the barricade. This was rebuilt when the enemy were driven off. Burton was killed by one of several bombs which exploded as he was attempting to rebuild the parapet. His body was never recovered.
Died	9 August 1915
Buried or Commemorated	Lone Pine Memorial to the Missing, Gallipoli. A bridge over Seven Creeks near Euroa, Victoria, was officially renamed Burton Bridge.
Current location of the VC	Australian War Memorial

Australian Victoria Cross Recipient



Corporal William **Dunstan**

Unit	7th Battalion
Born	8 March 1895 at Ballarat East, Victoria
Date of action	9 August 1915
Place	Lone Pine trenches, Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkey
Details	Early on the 9th the Turks made a determined counter-attack on a newly captured trench held by Lieutenant Tubb (also a VC winner), Corporals Burton (also a VC winner) and Dunstan and a few others. The Turks advanced up a sap and blew in the sandbag barricade but Dunstan, Tubb and Burton repulsed them and rebuilt it. Supported by two strong bombing parties, the enemy twice more destroyed the barricade but were driven off and the barricade was rebuilt. A bomb burst between Dunstan and Burton, killing Burton and temporarily blinding Dunstan.
Died	2 March 1957
Buried or Commemorated	Springvale Crematorium, Melbourne
Current location of the VC	Australian War Memorial

Australian Victoria Cross Recipient



Private John (Patrick) **Hamilton**

Unit	3rd Battalion
Born	24 January 1896 at Orange, New South Wales
Date of action	9 August 1915
Place	Lone Pine trenches, Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkey
Details	<p>The Turks had launched a violent general attack extending along much of the front. The northern part of the assault was directed at the junction of the 3rd and 4th Battalions. At Sasse's Sap the enemy forced the Australians back but were ousted by a counter-attack. Later the enemy forced the barricade and streamed up the sap towards the 3rd Battalion headquarters. The adjutant of the 3rd Battalion instructed several men to get out on the parapet and attack the Turks in the trench and those coming across open ground. Hamilton, under the cover of a few sandbags, lay out in the open shouting to those in the trenches where best to land their bombs while he kept up constant sniping fire against the Turkish bomb throwers. His example had much to do with the enemy being driven off during this attack.</p>
Died	27 February 1961
Buried or Commemorated	Woronora Cemetery, Sydney.
Current location of the VC	Australian War Memorial

Australian Victoria Cross Recipient



Lance Corporal Albert **Jacka**

Unit	14th Battalion
Born	10 January 1893 at Winchelsea, Victoria
Date of action	19-20 May 1915
Place	Courtney's Post, Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkey
Details	On 19 May, the Turks launched a general attack to push the Australians into the sea. They seized ten metres of trench at Courtney's Post, but Australians at either end stopped them from continuing to advance. At the northern end Jacka, with several others, tried to evict the Turks, but was beaten back. It was then decided that while a feint was made from the same end, Jacka would attack from the rear. The party waited long enough for Jacka to circle the rear and then threw two bombs and gave covering fire. Jacka leapt over the parapet, shot five Turks with his rifle, bayoneted two others and forced the rest to flee the captured trench.

It was generally believed that Jacka should have been awarded two more VCs for his actions at Pozieres (which the Official Historian claimed was the single most successful individual action of the war), and at Bullecourt. A member of his Battalion wrote: 'He deserved the Victoria Cross as thoroughly at Pozieres, Bullecourt and at Ypres as at Gallipoli . . . The whole AIF came to look on him as a rock of strength that never failed. We of the 14th Battalion never ceased to be thrilled when we heard of ourselves referred to . . . by passing units on the march as "some of Jacka's mob".' (Richard Reid, *For Valour*, Australia Post Philatelic Group, 2000 page 13)

Died	17 January 1932 at Melbourne
Buried or Commemorated	St Kilda Cemetery, Melbourne, with eight VC recipients as pallbearers
Current location of the VC	Australian War Memorial

Australian Victoria Cross Recipient



Lance Corporal Leonard
Maurice **Keysor**

Unit	1st Battalion
Born	3 November 1896 at Maida Vale, London. He arrived in Australia from Canada in 1914.
Date of action	7-8 August 1915
Place	Lone Pine trenches, Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkey
Details	On 7 August Keysor was in a trench which was being heavily bombed by the enemy. At great risk to himself he picked up two live Turkish bombs and threw them back at the enemy. Although wounded, he kept throwing bombs. The next day, at the same place, he bombed the enemy out of a position which made his trench vulnerable. He was again wounded. Although he was marked for hospital he stayed in the trenches and threw bombs for another company which had lost its bomb throwers. Keysor kept throwing both Turkish bombs and crude Australian bombs, manufactured on the beach, for fifty hours before he allowed himself to be evacuated for treatment.
Died	12 October 1951
Buried or	Urn at Golders Green Crematorium, London.
Commemorated	Plaque at Rookwood Cemetery Garden of Remembrance, Sydney
Current location of the VC	Australian War Memorial

Australian Victoria Cross Recipient



Captain Alfred John **Shout**

Unit	1st Battalion
Born	8 August 1882 in New Zealand
Date of action	9 August 1915
Place	Lone Pine trenches, Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkey
Details	<p>During the attack at Lone Pine a large portion of Sasse's sap was found to be occupied by the enemy. Captains Shout and Sasse decided to clear it. They gathered together three men carrying sandbags with which to construct barricades and then both officers charged down the trench, Shout bombing and Sasse shooting. They advanced in short 'hops', building a barricade at each stop. In the morning in one section of trench Shout killed eight enemy and routed the remainder. In the afternoon, gathering another party of eight and again accompanied by Sasse, he captured a further section of trench in similar fashion. They had just determined a suitable position for the final barricade when Shout lit three bombs for the final dash. The third bomb burst in his hand, blowing it completely away and shattering one side of his face and body. He was evacuated immediately but died of wounds and was buried at sea.</p>
Died	August (?) 1915
Buried or Commemorated	Lone Pine Memorial to the Missing, Gallipoli
Current location of the VC	Australian War Memorial

Australian Victoria Cross Recipient



Lieutenant William John
Symons

Unit	7th Battalion
Born	10 July 1889 at Eaglehawk, Bendigo, Victoria
Date of action	8-9 August 1915
Place	Lone Pine trenches, Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkey
Details	<p>Symons was in command of the right section of the newly captured trenches held by his battalion and repelled several counter-attacks with great coolness. At about 5am on 9 August the Turks made a series of determined attacks on an isolated sap known as Jacob's trench. Six officers were, in succession, killed or severely wounded in the sap and a portion of it was lost. Symons was then instructed by Lieutenant Colonel H.E. Elliot to retake the sap. Symons organised and led a charge which drove the Turks out. He then rebuilt the barricade. He killed two of the enemy with his revolver. Then, when the sap was attacked from the front and two flanks, he obtained permission from Elliot to withdraw to adjacent overhead cover, leaving fifteen metres of open trench to the enemy, so that another barricade could be erected. The Turks persisted in the attack and twice fired the barricade woodwork but Symons led rushes that drove them back and the fires were extinguished.</p>
Died	24 June 1948
Buried or Commemorated	Plaque at Garden of Remembrance, Melbourne
Current location of the VC	Australian War Memorial

Australian Victoria Cross Recipient



Second Lieutenant Hugo Vivian
Hope **Throssell**

Unit	10th Light Horse Regiment
Born	27 October 1884 at Northam, Western Australia
Date of action	29-30 August 1915
Place	Kaiakij Aghala (Hill 60), Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkey
Details	<p>An attack commenced at 1 am on the 29th and within seconds the light horsemen were engaged in furious hand-to-hand fighting in the Turkish trenches. They succeeded in driving the defenders back. About thirty minutes later, during consolidation, the Turks counter-attacked and overwhelmed the barricade in the trench. They were driven back. They attacked again at 3am on the 30th and a bloody fight took place. Despite appalling odds the 10th fought the Turks out of the trench back to their own lines. Just before daylight another attack was beaten back and at dawn the counter-attacks ceased. Despite his terrible wounds Throssell refused to leave his post to obtain medical assistance until all danger had passed. A soldier offered him a cigarette. 'He took the cigarette but could do nothing with it. The wounds in his shoulders and arms had stiffened, and his hands could not reach his mouth . . . [his] shirt was full of holes from pieces of bomb, and one of the 'Australia's [shoulder badges] was twisted and broken, and had been driven into his shoulder.' (Richard Reid, <i>For Valour</i>, Australia Post Philatelic Group, 2000 page 14.) When he had had his wounds dressed he returned to the firing line until ordered out of action by the medical officer.</p>
Died	19 November 1933
Buried or Commemorated	Karrakatta Cemetery, Perth. A memorial plaque was unveiled at Greenmount on 25 February 1954.
Current location of the VC	Australian War Memorial

Australian Victoria Cross Recipient



Captain Frederick Harold **Tubb**

Unit	7th Battalion
Born	10 July 1889 at Longwood, Victoria
Date of action	9 August 1915
Place	Lone Pine trenches, Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkey
Details	<p>During a Turkish counter-attack on 9 August Tubb was in command of a section of trench which was the scene of some intense fighting. When the enemy blew in a sandbag barricade Tubb led his men back, repulsed the enemy and had the barricade rebuilt. The enemy attacked and again twice blew in the barricades, but Tubb, bleeding from bomb wounds in the arm and scalp, continued to fight. Supported by Corporals Dunstan (also a VC winner) and Burton (also a VC winner), he succeeded in rebuilding the barricade. A bomb blast killed Burton and wounded Dunstan. Tubb obtained further men from the next post, Tubb's Corner. The enemy attack had weakened, however, and although heavy bombing continued the position was held. He later wrote: 'It is miraculous that I am alive. Three different times I was thrown yards away from bombs. Our trenches were filled with the dead, mostly ours. Burton . . . deserved the highest reward for his action for three times filling a breach in the parapet till they killed him. Dunstan (and others) also did magnificent work. I cannot write of details but many of our brave boys were blown to pieces.' (Richard Reid, <i>For Valour</i>, Australia Post Philatelic Group, 2000 page 14.)</p>
Died	21 September 1917
Buried or Commemorated	Lijessenthoek Military Cemetery, Poperinghe, Belgium
Current location of the VC	Australian War Memorial

Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918 - Volume IX Introduction

Volume IX – The Royal Australian Navy, 1914–1918

Introduction by Ross Lamont

The Australian War Memorial would like to acknowledge the kind permission of the author and the assistance of the University of Queensland Press in making this Introduction available on-line.

When C.E.W. Bean first submitted in August 1919 a proposal for an official history of Australia in the war of 1914–1918, he confidently expected that the whole work would be completed within three years, four at most.¹ At that point of time the historian of the Royal Australian Navy during the war had not been chosen. Bean was aware, however, that since September 1915, his close friend, Arthur Wilberforce Jose, had been writing such a history for the Commonwealth Naval Board. This had been only part of Jose's responsibilities: indeed, the expansion of intelligence work and censorship duties had caused the history to be set aside in 1916. Perhaps knowledge of this early start encouraged Bean in his expectation of early completion. In fact Jose's volume was not to be finished until more than nine years had passed.

From the very beginning circumstances made unlikely an early completion of what became Volume IX. On 2 October 1919, while deciding on Jose as the writer of that volume, the Naval Board proposed a censorship not only of his work but of all the military volumes, "particularly that relating to the occupation of German New Guinea Colony, in all cases where Naval matters or Naval Officers are mentioned."² Jose had submitted his resignation the day previous to the board's decision, but he withdrew it seventeen days later.³ He may well have known the board's choice of official historian for the R.A.N. at war. Unfortunately the Naval Board's concern over censorship, the desire of the First Naval Member to avoid interruption to Jose's intelligence work, and the latter's refusal to write the history while continuing with intelligence, delayed a definitive appointment.⁴ Although in December both Bean and Jose were taking his appointment for granted, three months later Jose was still greatly concerned about the extent of the Naval Board's censorship powers.⁵ Basically Jose accepted the board's right to censor some facts, but not opinions. Bean reassured Jose that in agreeing to a special censorship of the Navy volume "there was no idea of any censorship which might cover any past defect in administration or the conduct of operations if such defects existed ... It will therefore be perfectly clear that your opinions do not bind the Board."⁶ Jose appears to have been satisfied, for on 20 May 1920 he signed the agreement to write "a volume of History entitled 'The Story of the Royal Australian Navy'", and set to work.⁷

This document reflects the initial optimism for an early completion of the histories. It is probable that the wording of the draft agreements with the various authors was settled in late November or early December 1919. Jose gave him until the following July to deliver

two-thirds of the manuscript; the remaining third by 15 August 1920. He further undertook to correct all proofs so that the volume would be published by October of the same year, by which date it was thought that five or six volumes would have appeared.⁸

The improbability of meeting this schedule was recognized at the time by both Jose and the Naval Secretary, who verbally agreed that alteration of the dates in the draft was unnecessary. By September, however, the Navy Office had, as Minister and Acting Secretary, new men who, like the board, knew nothing of the terms of the agreement.⁹ Understandably they pressed Jose for the completed manuscript, while at the same time indicating unwillingness to pay his travelling expenses.¹⁰ Here were the first signs of the new board's unhappiness with their historian.

Although Bean planned to inaugurate the series in July 1920 with the publication of Volume I, his rejection of the paper manufactured in England for the histories caused that volume's postponement. Until it had appeared, all others, including Volume IX, would have to wait. Bean smoothed things over for Jose with the Naval Board, but admitted that a delivery date before Christmas was unlikely¹¹

In September 1920 Jose was busily at work editing the *Australian Encyclopaedia* but Bean, confident of only minor delay to his plans, asked him for a five thousand word draft on the work of the R.A.N. for the Royal Colonial Institute's history of the Oversea Empire's war effort¹² Jose was now beginning to realize that the completion of his volume would require more time than originally thought, but he saw no difficulty in Bean's request since "the R.C.I. matter is practically a summary of the fuller work".¹³

A much more serious obstacle occurred a month later. By then the Naval Board were proposing new delivery dates, two thirds "by August 1 and the rest by September 15", dates which had already passed. Jose believed this a device to allow the board to claim default and the abandonment of the history: provided he was paid for the work so far done, Jose accepted the prospect of cancellation with little regret.¹⁴ On the other hand Bean acted quickly to avert such a shipwreck of Volume IX. It was agreed that Jose's travelling expenses would be paid and that half the completed and censored manuscript would be given to the Editor on 1 February 1921, the balance a month later. By 5 November 1920 the preface, introduction and first seven chapters were with the Naval Board to be censored.¹⁵

On reading the manuscript, the board were appalled. The work was far from their idea of an official history, "a plain and unvarnished statement of the facts, leaving the reader to draw his own conclusions from the material placed before him".¹⁶ Jose had "contrary to what he was told, included his own personal opinions in this history".¹⁷ He was accordingly summoned to Melbourne where on 21 January 1921 he discovered what the Naval Board's view of their censorship actually meant.

They said flatly that the book was 'official', that the Government and the Board must take responsibility, and that nothing must go in that might hurt the feelings of the British Government, the Admiralty, any Australian politician, Admiral Patey, or the U.S. or Japanese Governments.

Recognizing that such an emasculated volume would be quite useless for Australians, Jose saw that all writing would have to stop until the question of the naval censorship was settled. The Naval Board proposed to submit to the Cabinet through its Minister, Mr Laird Smith, a typed copy of the draft chapters so far received with the disputed passages typed in red.¹⁸ This they did on 15 February 1921, by which time some Cabinet consideration had been given the matter.¹⁹ There appears, however, to have been no immediate result.

Jose drew up his report of the January meeting so that Bean might show it confidentially to the Prime Minister.²⁰ Bean, however, had not acted when three months later the Melbourne *Age* published a report suggesting that naval censorship of Jose's volume was concealing some scandal. Perhaps it was a straw in the wind that the Defence, rather than the Naval, Secretary enquired of Bean the meaning of this newspaper report. Jose denied having spoken to the press, but the issue gave Bean the chance to intervene in the stalemate between Jose and the Naval Board. Certain that the public would not accept a censored history, and armed with the recent press interest in the matter, Bean suggested to the board that their conception of a censorship was not what was intended when the original proposal of an official history was made. In his view they had the right to censor technical secrets, secrets of battle tactics or of inventions, all matters which might be "inadvisable to

disclose", but not to try to restrict the author's reasonable arguments and conclusions: "the nation requires the historians above everything to be free, even, if necessary, to criticise the authorities of their own or any country."²¹

To this representation there was no immediate reply: the Naval Board were unrepentant. In early August Senator G.F. Pearce, Minister for Defence, and his department began to take an interest, trying to discover "how it came about that the navy section alone required censorship".²² As a result of Bean's explanations, which emphasized the impasse, Senator Pearce pressed upon Laird Smith the wisdom of conciliation and suggested that the matter should be submitted to Cabinet.²³ The answer from the Navy Office showed that they were unmoved by this potentially more powerful intervention. Indeed the Minister in replying to Pearce incorporated, without any change, the whole of a hard-line minute of 11 August by the Acting First Naval Member and, further, indicated his own desire for an additional review by a committee of the Cabinet. To this the Defence Minister gave his concurrence before he left for Washington.²⁴

Understandably this letter was a severe setback for Jose. Before he received a copy of it, Bean was promising to take the matter up with the Prime Minister; after, he saw that there was little chance that Mr Hughes would intervene against a decision of two of his ministers.²⁵ At this, Bean wavered; he accepted the Minister's ruling that the public and not the author should draw conclusions from the facts and urged Jose to recommence writing on this basis "so dealing with the facts that any fair inferences are perfectly clear". The fight, if there was to be one, should be over a completed manuscript, when, with the passage of the time taken in writing it, the situation would very likely have improved. Bean believed that "our position will be very much stronger after the publication of volume one which should not be long now ... The more these histories are read, the stronger will become the public dislike to censorship except within necessary limits". He encouraged Jose:

If you will complete your work ... I will throw all my weight, both with the P.M. and with the other ministers, into obtaining you as far as possible freedom from censorship when the time comes.

Although this was a decision for delay, Bean had in mind only four or so months to the completion of the work, by which time, of course, the Washington Conference on Naval Limitation would have closed.²⁶

Jose, whom Bean feared might throw up the writing and be lost to the *Official History*, skilfully sidestepped either resignation or capitulation. He exploited the dichotomy between the generalized objections of the Naval Board and the particular sentences and passages in dispute he had discussed with the board in January. At that time Jose had offered to withdraw the whole of the introduction, while the Naval Board undertook to obtain "the Minister's--if necessary, the Cabinet's--judgement" on the contentious passages. But this had not happened and until the Navy Office obtained judgement, Jose, writing to Bean, insisted that he could not proceed: gently, Bean's suggested compromise was set on one side.

*I suggest, therefore, that the proper procedure to re-start me is for the Navy Office to return my ch.i with the definite criticisms of the Minister on the points specifically submitted to him. That will give me a guide, whether for protest against what I may consider unjustifiable censorship or for continuing my work on the Minister's lines.*²⁷

Seeing in the proposal a chance to recover some of the lost ground, Bean promptly addressed the Defence Secretary. He adopted Jose's points while adding his own anxiety concerning the Naval Board's extensive interpretation of their powers of censorship, pointing out that this made progress with the history impossible. For the first time Bean now sought to address the Naval Board, not, as before, directly, but through the Defence Department.²⁸

At precisely this moment the Minister for the Navy blundered. In answering a parliamentary question coincidentally on the very issue of the censorship of Volume IX, he replied to the effect that, only after the complete manuscript had been received, would the question of censorship be considered.²⁹ Bean (and Jose) both pounced upon the obvious fact that Mr Laird Smith's reply established a vicious cycle, since the Minister showed himself unaware that, as agreed in January, no progress could be made until decisions on disputed passages in already submitted chapters had been received. In writing to the Defence Department

Bean did not fail to stress the indefinite delay that this confusion would cause. Now, too, there was another tactical change. A week earlier Bean had been recommending conference between Jose and the Naval Board concerning alterations in a completed version: two days after the Minister's parliamentary reply this had become conference between Jose and the Minister.³⁰ These new tactics, if not accidental, were remarkably astute, possibly prescient, suggestive of Bean's great sense of political timing. For in less than seven weeks the Department of the Navy ceased to be and was reabsorbed into the Department of Defence. It would not be Laird Smith with whom Jose would confer.

Meanwhile, the Assistant Minister for Defence, Sir Granville Ryrle, gathered together all of Bean's points and sent them to Laird Smith. In minuting these, the Acting First Naval Member for the first time began to show more flexibility: he agreed that a further conference with Jose was desirable and likely to be satisfactory. Although the Navy Minister approved such a conference, nothing was done before his portfolio disappeared.³¹

Things then moved more easily. On 28 January the new First Naval Member interviewed Jose, to the latter's considerable satisfaction.³² A month later, Bean reported that the new Minister for Defence, Mr Walter Massy Greene, would "read the eight chapters already sent in, decide on the nature of censorship, if any; and, if any serious objection is taken by him to anything in the eight chapters he will see Jose himself".³³ But again nothing appears to have resulted, for at the end of April the Navy Office was still hopeful of being represented at any conference between Jose and the Minister.³⁴

The breaking of the impasse had an unexpected, if related, origin. By the end of May Jose's finances were under extreme pressure. When he had returned in 1920 to Sydney he had been obliged to buy rather than lease a home there. For this he had taken out a mortgage, confident that as "the history was to be completed within a few months" he would suffer no great financial stress or embarrassment. Two years later, however, as Bean indicated to the Minister of Defence, the failure to obtain an early decision on the censorship question prevented Jose's completing the history, so denying him his money.³⁵ Bean's advocacy secured a substantial proportion of the agreed sum, but, more importantly, resulted in a decision - "to refer this question to a Sub-Committee of the Cabinet consisting of the Prime Minister, the Minister for Home and Territories, and the Minister for Defence".³⁶ Exactly what happened next is not clear, but in the first week of September Bean was making arrangements for sub-editing Jose's completed manuscript.³⁷

By then it had been decided that Jose would see Senator Pearce in Melbourne. A satisfactory interview took place on 14 September.

*Pearce scrapped practically the whole of the Naval Board's objections, which did not appeal to him. I am sorry to say that what did appeal to him were unimportant phrases which he thought cast a reflection on the Fisher Ministries. This made the task of satisfying him very easy, because not one of the phrases mattered to me or to the History two straws: but I am sorry that his attempt at censorship was guided by such petty personal reasons. However I've now got the matter almost exactly as I wrote it and everyone is content.*³⁸

The Naval Board view of censorship of the *Official History* had been defeated, but they were not without some success.

In the first place one may question whether the issue of censoring Volume IX was of the first importance to the Naval Board. It was probably of far greater consequence to them whether any history at all should be published. A naval history had been conceived in 1915, but by a different board. Whether that history was intended for publication may be doubted. Bean's proposal was that of an outsider to the Navy. Secondly the Admiralty had outlined on 27 June 1918 at the Imperial Conference a policy of Imperial naval defence unacceptable to the Dominion leaders. Nor did it help that the Admiralty were of two minds concerning post-war strategy in the Far East and the Pacific. Thirdly, any Australian government considering naval policy was caught between Lord Jellicoe's ambitious recommendations on the one hand and a post-war need to cut public spending on the other. Until policy was settled would the appearance of a book criticizing Admiralty policy, as Jose's did, really help?³⁹

This question requires more careful attention than is possible here, but it is to be noted that Jose himself believed such an explanation of the Naval Board's obstruction. Thus in January 1921 he maintained "that the officers who are censoring the volume are all R.N. officers, or R.A.N. transferred from the R.N., and that only one of them has any knowledge at all -

before, say, 1918 – of Australian affairs or of the events of the Pacific war”.⁴⁰ They thought “it would be dangerous to publish something tending to lessen Australian confidence in the Admiralty’s omniscience and all-wisdom”.⁴¹ Rear-Admiral Sir Percy Grant actually told Jose that “the story of the first few months of naval work, in which the Admiralty muddled things up badly, would ... destroy Australian confidence in the Admiralty”.⁴² Two years later Jose went so far as to claim “we now know that Grant was hostile to *any* Australian naval history”.⁴³ Whatever the truth of Jose’s contentions, Volume IX, of course, did appear, but not until after the Washington Conference had long ended, by which time Australian naval policy was well and truly determined.

With the censorship issue ostensibly behind him, Jose’s original confidence in early completion returned. He had told Senator Pearce during their crucial September conference that he would try to have the book completed by the end of March 1923 and Bean assumed this in his calculations.⁴⁴ Yet a further six years were to pass before the volume appeared.

In September 1922 the first eight chapters and chapter xiii were finished and a third of the remainder was in draft. Jose was then under heavy pressure preparing the *Australian Encyclopaedia* for the printer.⁴⁵ There was some difficulty and mild farce in locating for his use one of the working censored typed copies held by the government departments, and three months passed before he received his copy. By mid-March 1923 chapters ix, xi, xii and xiv were nearly completed: chapter xv, Jose believed, would not take long. The real difficulty lay with chapter x, the work of the R.A.N. in European waters, for which Jose had practically no sources.⁴⁶ Bean, concerned at this lack, turned his attention to the problem, although Jose was less anxious. There are several indications that, as originally conceived, Volume IX would not have treated the work of the R.A.N. in waters distant from Australia as fully as it finally did. Jose’s very early efforts to have the Navy Office locate sources were fruitless and he welcomed Bean’s proposal to circularize officers who served abroad on Australian warships. Bean was genuinely alarmed by Jose’s impatient intention to “state in his pages that for the works of the *Australia, Melbourne* and *Sydney* in the North Sea the reader must be referred to the forthcoming British History”.⁴⁷

The valuable co-operation of Commander R.C. Garsia, R.A.N., was enlisted, but a more dramatic development occurred in July 1923 when the Minister for Defence requested a report on the progress of the naval history.⁴⁸ Bean seized upon this to raise the question of the lack of Admiralty sources, in particular the Letters of Proceedings from British squadrons in which the Australian ships served. It was not, however, until Jose and Garsia intervened two months later that the Navy Office, now more co-operative, took steps to secure access to the records at the Admiralty:

*Macandie says unofficially that Bruce has gone home full of enthusiasm for the local squadron, and hopes to get it much improved and securely based for the future. He suggests that March or April next, when Bruce returns, would be a very opportune time for the appearance of vol. ix.*⁴⁹

The Admiralty, also anxious to help, would only allow scrutiny of the documents in the Admiralty itself, and more time elapsed in finding a reliable researcher to make a *précis* of these records in London.⁵⁰ Proofs of completed chapters began to be received from the printer before the *précis* of Admiralty records was received in May. Being merely identification of Australian ships wherever they occurred in the records and lacking a central thread of narrative, these extracts were extremely disappointing: they did not explain what Jose really wanted, “the policy of a Higher Command in the use of squadrons, etc., of which Australian ships were part.”⁵¹ Fortunately Jose was now receiving from the War Museum valuable matter in diaries and accounts kept by men who served on the ships.⁵²

In the second half of 1924 Bean went to England for surgery and tried to obtain what Jose needed. Although Garsia, now in England, was also sanguine, the result was disappointing as the Admiralty knew “of no short cut to the answer of this question and that the only way to get at it would be to wade through the correspondence. The policy in the North Sea ... was constantly changing.”⁵³ Additional documents, from the Navy Office or the War Museum, surfaced but in the first half of 1925, Jose’s work on “this blessed encyclopaedia, illness and a certain amount of enforced holiday” stopped progress.⁵⁴

Bean became resigned to the unforeseen delay and new proposed to publish Volume X before Volume IX. But as it happened Jose was also involved in helping along the production

of Volume X since its author appeared incapable of completing it. Bean's extraordinary patience gave out and he requested authorization for Jose to finish the Rabaul volume and refused further communication with its author, S.S. Mackenzie.⁵⁵ The story of how this crisis was surmounted is irrelevant here, but Bean's dependence on Jose in this way is a reminder that Jose's work on other volumes reduced the time he could spend on his own.⁵⁶ He was consulted by Bean with respect to Volumes I, II, VII, X, XI and XII and additionally paid for work on at least Volumes VII and XII: the revision of Volume X and Heney's drafts for Volume XI was particularly extensive.⁵⁷

By the end of 1925 Garsia's own researches in the Admiralty had been successful, although he was unable to discover anything worthwhile about the operations in the North Sea of that "phantom", H.M.A.S. *Australia*.⁵⁸ Meanwhile Jose submitted, with little enthusiasm for his efforts, portion of chapter xiv, whereupon Bean took an opportunity to influence the character of Volume IX.⁵⁹ There is no doubt that he was anxious to keep to a minimum of political content of the histories. This was not possible, of course, with Volume XI, nor with Volume IX, where consideration of strategy, and British strategy at that, was inescapable. To offset this difficulty Bean decided that personal experiences of the crews of the Australian mercantile marine should be included. To obtain these he circularized, with Jose's approval, all the Australian steamship companies involved in war transport asking for particulars.⁶⁰ This information, contained in Appendix 6, took a further two years to reach completion.

Writing continued and Jose finished the section of the ill-fated chapter x, dealing with the *Sydney* and the *Melbourne*. Nevertheless the pressure of work was so great that probably it partly convinced Jose to leave Australia. The result was a tragic and traumatic break with his long standing friend, Mr George Robertson, the bookseller and publisher. Bean did not condemn Jose:

*Jose has been worked almost beyond the limits of even his capacity during the last year. Mr. George Robertson, his employer, keeping him under constant pressure in order to secure completion of the very big work which he had undertaken in the Australian Encyclopaedia. I have kept constantly in touch with him but have realized for some time past that it was impossible for him to do more work that he is doing; indeed I have been afraid of a breakdown.*⁶¹

On 28 April 1926 Jose sailed with his family to France hoping to find at sea the leisure for completing the outstanding two and a half chapters. Even after Jose's departure Bean anticipated publication in August.⁶² It was not to be. The voyage was almost a sleepless one for Jose who thus wrote very little.⁶³

Once ashore in country retreat, where the cost of living was less, work resumed. On Armistice Day 1926 he despatched "the last fragment of the volume, typed, as you will notice, with the last surviving fragment of my type writer ribbon".⁶⁴ In Australia Bean was taking an even larger role in the making of the volume, attending to Jose's requests to check doubtful points and filling in minor omissions in its later chapters, such as the supply and service of the R.A.N. College cadets, new ship construction, the work of the Port War Signal Stations and of the Examination Service. In many of these instances Bean was looking for naval examples of detailed personal experiences corresponding to those he used in his own military volumes. In the first half of 1927 a minor avalanche of personal reminiscences and records was being despatched to Bean from the War Museum even as proofs arrived from the printer. Nevertheless, he was able to send the remaining chapters to Senator Pearce a fortnight before the latter left for Geneva on 21 June 1927. After Pearce had approved these, Bean advised, the volume would be printed immediately.⁶⁵

Perhaps because Senator Pearce had one or two objections and had meanwhile left Australia, the corrected manuscript had also to pass the Minister for Defence. Before it did so, Bean received a copy of the first volume of the cruiser war section of the German Official Naval History and saw the necessity of incorporating much new material in the early chapters of Jose's volume, those dealing with von Spee's squadron. This was ominous indeed for it meant that Jose's completed and approved sections were becoming out of date even before publication.⁶⁶ Bean now hurried matters forward, apparently coping with all the additional hares he had started, and was looking to publish by Christmas 1927. But before that date, came the final delay, from an unexpected quarter.

Even as Bean was asking for corrected proofs from the printer he received information that a batch of "exceedingly interesting" records from the Admiralty was being sent out.⁶⁷ In fact, there were two consignments, and it was the arrival of the second, in May 1928, which led to major alteration.

*... another delay has occurred ... due to the fact that I have for the first time received from the Admiralty papers, which I have been striving for many years to obtain, throwing light on the history of our ships not only in the North Sea and Mediterranean, but in the West Indies and the Pacific.*⁶⁸

With this material Bean was able to undertake a major reconstruction of chapter x. Alterations and additions were completed by the end of May.⁶⁹ Jose, now in London, was beginning to wonder whether the volume would ever come out, and if it did, whether he would be able to recognize it. But when the completed work, published in late September 1928, reached him, he generously acknowledged Bean's many improvements.⁷⁰

The writing of Volume IX was an immensely complex process in which there interacted many elements, some of which have been traced here. The book was undoubtedly a product of the relationship between two important Australian historians and the controlled tension which arose from their different approaches to the writing of history. Jose sought the nation in its major decisions, political or strategic; Bean found it in the detailed experience of its fighting men. Further, the naval history was written within the constraints of practical life:

*The delay in this volume has never been entirely Jose's fault, but was partly due to the previous Naval Board, which, in spite of Macandie's efforts, held up the material until Jose had engaged in the Encyclopaedia; and as that was his bread and butter, and a very big job, it naturally had to come first.*⁷¹

In the end, however, the impression remains that Volume IX of the *Official History* was a casualty, although not a fatal one, of certain aspects of the Anglo-Australian relationship. In the making of Jose's book, enthusiasm confronted calculation, and gained the victory; but only when it no longer mattered.

Ross Lamont
University of New England
September 1984

Notes

1. C.E.W. Bean, memorandum, "Histories of the War", 14 August 1919 (copy), MP525/1, file 5/6/48, Australian Archives, Melbourne (hereafter cited as AAM). Stephens Ellis's useful article, "The Censorship of the Official Naval History of Australia in the Great War", *Historical Studies*, Vol. 20 (April 1983), pp. 367-382, in surveying some of the ground covered here, considers the question of censorship of Volume IX more from Bean's point of view.
2. G. L. Macandie (Naval Secretary), Minute of Meeting of Naval Board, 2 October 1919, MP525/1, file 5/6/48, AAM. Bean to Defence Secretary, 2 October 1919 (copy), Bean Papers, 3DRL 7953 Item 10, Australian War Memorial (hereafter cited as AWM).
3. A.W. Jose to Naval Secretary, 1 October 1919, MP525/1, file 5 / 6 / 48, AAM. Jose to Naval Secretary, 18 October 1919 (copy), Jose Papers AWM39 (formerly Bean MSS 115), AWM.
4. Jose to Bean, 28 November 1919, Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM.
5. Bean to Jose, 8 December 1919 (copy); Jose to Bean, 10 December 1919; Jose to Bean, 8 March 1920, *ibid.*
6. Bean to Jose, 14 March 1920 (copy), *ibid.*
7. Agreement made the 20th May 1920 between A.W. Jose ... and the Commonwealth of Australia ... , MP 525/1, File 5/ 6/48, AAM.
8. *Ibid.*, and Jose to Bean, 9 September 1920. Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM.
9. W.H. Laird Smith was Minister for the Navy, 28 July 1920 to 21 December 1921. R. Hyslop, *Australian Naval Administration 1900-1939*, (Melbourne: Hawthorn, 1973), pp. 51-53, 144, 167.
10. Jose to Bean, 28 August, 9 September 1920, Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM.
11. Bean to Jose, 11 September 1920 (copy), *ibid.* Bean to S.S. Mackenzie, 3 October 1920 (copy), Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 13, AWM.

12. Jose to Bean, 9 September 1920. Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM. Bean to Jose, 12 September 1920, Jose Papers AWM 39 (formerly Bean MSS 392), AWM.
13. Jose to Bean, 17 September 1920, Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM. The appeared in 1924 as chapter xiii of Section II of Volume III of Lucas, C.P. (ed), *The Empire at War*, London: (Oxford University Press, 1924).
14. Jose to Bean, 20 October 1920, Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item AWM.
15. Bean to Jose, private, 3 November 1920 (copy); Official Historian to Jose, 3 November 1920 (copy); Jose to Bean, 5 November 1920, *ibid.*
16. Captain C. Hardy, R.N. (Second Naval Member) to First Naval Member, undated (but December 1920 or early 1921), MP472/1 file 8/19/8628, AAM.
17. Rear-Admiral Sir Percy Grant, R.N. (First Naval Member), minute, 14 December 1920, *ibid.* A more detailed analysis of the board's criticisms of the draft chapters is to be found on pp. 373, 374 of Ellis, "Censorship" .
18. Jose to Bean, 25 January 1920 (two letters), Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM.
19. Laird Smith to Mr. W. M. Hughes, 15 February 1921, CP 103/22 Item 7, Australian Archives, Canberra.
20. See n. 18.
21. T. Trumble (Defence Secretary) to Bean, 28 May 1921; Bean to Trumble, 30 May 1921 (copy); Jose to Bean, 1 June 1920, Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM. Bean to Jose, 30 May, 11 June 1921 (two letters), Jose Papers AWM 39 (392), AWM. Bean to Captain A.M. Treacy, (Acting Naval Secretary), 13 June 1921, MP 472/1, file 2 /21/9045, AAM.
22. Bean to Jose, 8 August 1921, Jose Papers AWM 39 (392), AWM. W.A. Newman (Defence, Chief Clerk) to Bean, undated (but first week of August 1921), Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM.
23. Bean to Newman, 15 August 1921 (copy); G.F. Pearce to Laird Smith, 5 September 1921, MP 472/1, file 2/21/15183, AAM.
24. Hardy (Acting First Naval Member) to Minister, 11 August 1921; Laird Smith to Pearce, 17 September 1921 (draft), MP472/1, file 2/21/9045 and 2/21/15183 (respectively), AAM. Bean to Jose, 25 October 1921, Jose Papers AWM 39 (392), AWM.
25. Bean to Jose, 15 October, 1 November 1921, Jose Papers AWM 39 (392), AWM.
26. *Ibid.* and Bean to Jose, 25 October, 26 October 1921 (two letters), *ibid.*
27. Jose to Bean, 1 November 1921, Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM.
28. Bean to Defence Secretary, 2 November 1921 (copy), *ibid.* For Bean's earlier tactics, see Ellis, "Censorship", p. 375.
29. *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 97 p. 12396.
30. Jose to Bean, 4 November 1921, Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM. Bean to Defence Secretary, 5 November 1921 (copy), Jose Papers AWM 39 (392), AWM.
31. Sir Granville Ryrie to Laird Smith, 9 November 1921; Hardy, minute, 17 November 1921 (on Jose to Laird Smith, 5 November 1921), MP 472 / 1, file 2 / 21 / 15183, AAM. The new First Naval Member took up duty on 23 November 1921.
32. Jose to Bean, 20 February 1922, Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM.
33. Bean minute, 27 February 1922 (on Jose to Bean, 20 February 1922), *ibid.*
34. Macandie to Trumble, 27 April 1922, MP 472 / 1, file 2 / 21 / 15183, AAM.
35. Jose to Bean, 30 May 1922 (copy); Bean to Jose, 1 June 1922; Jose to Bean, 6 June 1922 (copy), Jose Papers AWM 39 (392), AWM. Bean to Trumble, 7 June 1922 (copies of two letters), Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM.
36. Trumble to Bean, 21 June 1922, *ibid.*
37. Bean to F.M. Cutlack, 6 September 1922 (copy), *ibid.*
38. Bean to Jose 7 September 1922, Jose Papers AWM 39 (392), AWM. Jose to Bean, 15 September 1922, Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM.
39. Roskill, S., *Naval Policy Between the Wars. 1: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929*, (London: Collins, 1968), chapter 7, especially pp. 271-83. It was highly improbable that Royal Navy officers serving on the Naval Board would help to pour Australian oil on the flames ignited by the debate over the conduct of the naval war on the North Sea.
40. Jose to Bean, 25 January 1921, Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM.
41. Jose to Bean, 1 June 1921, *ibid.*
42. Jose to Bean, 13 October 1921, *ibid.*
43. Jose to Bean, 3 December 1923, *ibid.*

44. Jose to Bean, 15 September 1922; Bean to Jose, 18 September 1922 (copy); Jose to Bean, 2 January 1923, *ibid*.
45. Jose to Bean, 23 January, 5 April 1923, *ibid*.
46. Jose to Macandie, 14 March 1923 (copy), Jose Papers AWM 39 (115), AWM. Chapters xi and xii became the present chapter xi, xiii became xii, and so on.
47. Bean to Jose, 22 April 1923, Jose Papers AWM 39 (392), AWM. Jose to Bean, 26 April 1923; Bean to Defence Secretary, 28 April 1923 (copy), Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM.
48. Bean to Jose, 24 July 1923, Jose Papers AWM 39 (392), AWM.
49. Bean to Jose, 9 August 1923, *ibid*. Jose to Bean, 25 September 1923, Bean Paper 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM. The Prime Minister, Mr S.M. Bruce, was in London for the 1923 Imperial Conference. Jose subsequently reported that it was Macandie, not Bruce, "who wanted the naval volume out in March", Jose to Bean, 20 December 1923, Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 13, AWM. This may be so, but in correspondence with the Defence Department Bean took it for granted that it was Bruce; and was not disabused of his assumption, Bean to Newman, 8 November 1923 (copy) Jose Papers AWM 39 (392), AWM.
50. Jose to Bean, 5 November 1923; telegram, Newman to Bean, 9 February 1924, Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM.
51. Bean to Jose, 20 May 1924, Jose Papers AWM 39 (392), AWM. Jose to Garsia, 20 January 1925 (copy), Jose Papers AWM 39 (115), AWM.
52. Jose to Bean, 21 May 1924, Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM.
53. T.B. Heyes (Australian War Museum, Clerk) to Bean, 23 December 1924 (copy), Jose Papers AWM 39 (392), AWM.
54. Jose to Garsia, 20 January 1925 (copy), Jose Papers AWM 39 (115), AWM.
55. Bean to Mackenzie; Bean to Newman, 28 October 1925 (copies), Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 13, AWM.
56. Cf. Nelson, H. and M. Piggott, Introduction to S.S. Mackenzie, *The Australians at Rabaul*, Volume X, (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press. 1987).
57. Piggott, M., *A Guide to the Personal Family and Official Papers of C.E.W Bean*, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1983), pp. 46–50. There is some evidence of Jose working on Volume VIII. See also Hill, A .J., Introduction to H.S. Gullett, *The A. I. F. in Sinai and Palestine*, Volume VII, (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press 1984), pp. xxix, xxx.
58. Garsia to Jose, November 1925, Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM.
59. Jose to Bean, 8 November 1925, *ibid*.
60. Bean to Jose, 16, 18 November 1925; Bean to Newman, 23 November 1925 (copies), *ibid*.
61. Bean to Newman, 30 April 1926 (copy), *ibid*. For Robertson's side of the quarrel, see Barker, A.W., *Dear Robertson*, (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1982), p. 139. Robertson's failure to pay Jose a promised bonus for his work on the encyclopaedia was a severe blow. Jose to Bean, 12 July, 14 October 1926, Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 11, AWM.
62. Bean to Newman, 28, 30 April 1926 (copies), Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM.
63. Jose to Bean, 30 May 1926, Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 11, AWM.
64. Jose to Bean, 11 November 1926 *ibid*.
65. Radiogram, Bean to Defence, 8 June 1927 (copy), Bean to Pearce, 8 June 1927 (copy), Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 11, AWM.
66. Bean to Jose, 28 July 1927 (copy), Bean to Macandie, 22 August 1927 (copy), *ibid*.
67. Bean to J.J. Green (Government Printer), 24 November 1927 (copy), Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 12, AWM.
68. Bean to M.L. Shepherd (Defence Secretary), 16 May 1928 (copy), *ibid*.
69. Bean to Macandie, 23 May 1928 (copy), *ibid*.
70. Jose to Bean, 26 July 1928, 22 November 1928, *ibid*.
71. Bean to Newman, 30 April 1926, Bean Papers 3DRL 7953 Item 10, AWM.