GREENBANK NAA NEWSLETTER
GREY FUNNEL DITS

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Greenbank Naval Association Sub. Section:

Events for April / May 2019

April:

Sunday	07 April	2019	1030-1200	Normal Meeting	RSL Rooms
Wednesday	24 April	2019	1000-1130	Executive Meeting	RSL Rooms
Thursday	25 April	2019	0930	Anzac Day Services	
Tuesday	30 April	2019:	Last day for benefits for non-financial members		

MAY:

Saturday	04 May	2019	1830-2300	Dining in night	Glenn Hotel
Tuesday	07 May	2019	1930-2100	Normal Meeting	RSL Rooms
Wednesday	29 May	2019	1000-1130	Executive Meeting	RSL Rooms

Editors Request:

Articles for the newsletter can be handed in at meetings, or by email: articles may be edited to fit the newsletter.

The contents of this edition of the newsletter have been obtained from information provided from Len Kingston-Kerr whom I thank greatly, various publication publications and NAA information emailed in.

NAVAL PERSONALITIES:

ABCD Justin Brown:

Able Seaman Clearance Diver Justin James Brown was a member of Clearance Diving Team Four during the Team's 1999 deployment to East Timor for Operation WARDEN. On the night of 21 October 1999, CDT 4 was tasked with a clandestine reconnaissance in advance of an amphibious landing by Australian troops into the Oecussi Enclave, West Timor.

As part of a swimmer reconnaissance pair Able Seaman Brown was tasked with gathering beach intelligence for the proposed landing site. His mission was to select the most suitable beach for the landing planned for the next morning. In addition, he was tasked to provide surface protection and early warning of impending danger, working close in shore, and for the submerged dive team. During the reconnaissance, a number of shots and explosions were heard coming from the nearby town centre while two vehicles proceeded along the beach conducting a search to seaward using high intensity lights.

During the period of greatest threat from compromise, Able Seaman Brown jeopardised his own safety by remaining close to the shore to provide support to his Commanding Officer and the submerged dive team.

His actions in remaining in place without being compromised showed great personal courage and is in the best traditions of the Royal Australian Navy. In recognition of his deeds he was awarded a Commendation for Gallantry

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ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY ADMIRALS:

Rear Admiral Peter M. Quinn CSC, RAN, joined the Royal Australian Navy as a warfare officer in 1983 from Mackay, Queensland. Following initial training at the Royal Australian Naval College HMAS Creswell, he served in a number of RAN and Royal Canadian Navy frigates and destroyers as an officer-of-the-watch and Air Intercept Controller. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1990 and in 1991 deployed to the Persian Gulf in HMAS Darwin.

Completing Principal Warfare Officer (PWO) training in 1992, he was awarded the Sydney-Emden Prize and Saint Barbara Association Award as dux of the course and went on to serve as PWO in the frigate HMAS Newcastle and destroyer HMAS Perth. As a newly promoted Lieutenant Commander he served as Officer-in-Charge of the RAN Maritime Warfare Training Centre. In September 1999 he deployed to East Timor with the International Force East Timor. From early 2000 Lieutenant Commander Quinn served as the Executive Officer of the frigate HMAS Adelaide, prior to being promoted to Commander in mid-2001 to manage Navy's combat system operator, diving, mine warfare and command team training as the Head of Combat System Training at HMAS Watson.

Commander Quinn's next appointment was as captain of the frigate HMAS Sydney from 2003 to 2006. During his time in command HMAS Sydney became the first ship to conduct the extensive guided missile frigate upgrade. He was awarded a Conspicuous Service Cross for his outstanding achievement as commanding officer of HMAS Sydney during that time.

On promotion to Captain he served in the Capability Development Group as Director Maritime Combat Development until early 2009 and commanded the frigate HMAS ANZAC from June 2009 to October 2010. In 2011 he completed the Defence and Strategic Studies Course and was promoted to commodore in December that year. He served as Director General Navy Capability, Transition and Sustainment until December 2014, where he was responsible for transitioning Navy capabilities into service; most notably the new Landing Helicopter Dock Amphibious ships, Guided Missile Destroyers and Seahawk Romeo combat helicopters.
In December 2014 he was promoted to Rear Admiral and appointed as Head Joint Capability Coordination. On behalf of the Vice Chief of Defence Force and as an outcome of the Defence First Principles Review, he recently led the detailed design of the new Capability Life Cycle and is now appointed as Head Joint Capability Management and Integration.
RADM Quinn is married to Rebecca and they have two children.

NAVAL DISASTERS:

USS Scorpion (SSN-589) was a Skipjack-class nuclear submarine of the United States Navy and the sixth vessel of the U.S. Navy to carry that name. Scorpion was lost on 22 May 1968, with 99 crewmen dying in the incident. USS Scorpion is one of two nuclear submarines the U.S. Navy has lost, the other being USS Thresher. It was one of four mysterious submarine disappearances in 1968, the others being the Israeli submarine INS Dakar, the French submarine Minerve and the Soviet submarine K-129. She was launched 19 December 1959, sponsored by Mrs. Elizabeth Morrison, the daughter of the last commander of the World War II-era USS Scorpion (which was also lost with all hands, in 1944). Assigned to Submarine Squadron 6, Division 62, Scorpion departed New London, Connecticut, 24 August for a two-month European deployment. During that time, she participated in exercises with 6th Fleet units and NATO-member navies. After returning to New England in late October, she trained along the eastern seaboard until May 1961. On 9 August 1961, she returned to New London, moving to Norfolk, Virginia, a month later. In 1962, she earned a Navy Unit Commendation. During late winter, early spring, and autumn of 1966, she deployed for special operations. After completing those Norfolk was Scorpion's port for the remainder of her career, and she specialized in developing nuclear submarine warfare tactics. Varying roles from hunter to hunted, she participated in exercises along the Atlantic coast, Bermuda, and Puerto Rico operating areas. From June 1963 to May 1964, she interrupted operations for an overhaul at Charleston. She resumed duty in late spring, but was again interrupted from 4 August to 8 October for a transatlantic patrol. In the spring of 1965, she conducted a similar patrol in European waters. After completing those assignments, her commanding officer (CO) received a Navy Commendation Medal for outstanding leadership, foresight, and professional skill. Other Scorpion officers and crewmen were also cited for meritorious achievement. Scorpion is reputed to have entered an inland Russian sea during a "Northern Run" in 1966, where it filmed a Soviet missile launch through its periscope before fleeing from Soviet Navy ships. In late October 1967, Scorpion started refresher training and weapons system acceptance tests, and was given a new commanding officer, Francis Slattery. Following type training out of Norfolk, Virginia, she got underway on 15 February 1968 for a Mediterranean Sea deployment. She operated with the 6th Fleet into May and then headed west for home. Scorpion suffered several mechanical malfunctions including a chronic problem with Freon leakage from refrigeration systems. An electrical fire occurred in an escape trunk when a water leak shorted out a shore power connection. (However, major steam and leakage problems are not uncommon on U.S. Navy or Royal Navy submarine deployments, even in the 21st Century.

There is no evidence that the Scorpion's speed was restricted in May 1968, although it was conservatively observing a depth limitation of 500 feet, due to the incomplete implementation of planned post-Thresher safety checks and modifications.
Departing the Mediterranean on 16 May. Some U.S. ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) operated from the U.S. Naval base at Rota and it is speculated that USS Scorpion provided noise cover for USS John C. Calhoun (SSBN-630) as they both ran out to the Atlantic and that, as usual, there were Soviet fast nuclear attack submarines (SSN) attempting to detect and follow the U.S. SSBN; in this case two fast 32 knot Soviet November-class hunter-killer subs.
Scorpion was then detailed to observe Soviet naval activities in the Atlantic in the vicinity of the Azores. An Echo II class submarine was operating with this Soviet task force, as well as a Russian guided missile destroyer. Having observed and listened to the Soviet units, Scorpion prepared to head back to Naval Station Norfolk. For an unusually long period of time, beginning shortly before midnight on 20 May 1968 and ending after midnight 21 May 1958, Scorpion attempted to send radio traffic to Naval Station Rota, but was only able to reach a Navy communications station in Nea Makri, Greece, which forwarded Scorpion's messages to ComSubLant, Commander Slattery's last message, that he was closing on the Soviet submarine and research group, running at a steady 15 knots at 350 feet "to begin surveillance of the Soviets". Six days later the media reported she was overdue at Norfolk. The Navy suspected possible failure and launched a public search. Scorpion and her crew were declared "presumed lost" on 5 June. Her name was struck from the Naval Vessel Register on 30 June. The public search continued with a team of mathematical consultants led by Dr. John Piña Craven, the Chief Scientist of the U.S. Navy's Special Projects Division. They employed the methods of Bayesian search theory, initially developed during the search for a hydrogen bomb lost off the coast of Palomares, Spain, in January 1966 in the Palomares B-52 crash.
Some reports indicate that a large and secret search was launched three days before Scorpion was expected back from patrol. This, combined with other declassified information, leads to speculation that the U.S. Navy knew of the Scorpion's destruction before the public search was launched. At the end of October 1968, the Navy's oceanographic research ship, Mizar, (T-AGOR-11) located sections of the hull of Scorpion on the seabed, about 740 km (400 nm; 460 mi) southwest of the Azores, on the eastern edge of the Sargasso Sea, under more than 3,000 m (9,800 ft) of water. This was after the Navy had released sound tapes from its underwater "SOSUS" listening system, which contained the sounds of the destruction of Scorpion. The court of inquiry was subsequently reconvened and other vessels, including the bathyscaphe Trieste II, were dispatched to the scene, collecting many pictures and other data.
Although Craven received much credit for locating the wreckage of Scorpion, Gordon Hamilton, an acoustics expert who pioneered the use of hydro acoustics to pinpoint Polaris missile splashdown locations, was Instrumental in defining a compact "search box" wherein the wreck was ultimately found. Hamilton had established a listening station in the Canary Islands that obtained a clear signal of what some scientists believe was the noise of the vessel's pressure hull imploding as she passed crush depth. A Naval Research Laboratory scientist named Chester "Buck" Buchanan, using a towed camera sled of his own design aboard Mizar, finally located Scorpion. The towed camera sled, which was fabricated by J. L. "Jac" Hamm of Naval Research Laboratory's Engineering Services Division, is housed in the National Museum of the United States Navy. Buchanan had located the wrecked hull of Thresher in 1964 using this technique. It would appear that the bow of Scorpion skidded upon impact with the globigerina ooze on the sea floor, digging a sizable trench. The sail had been dislodged as the hull of the operations compartment upon which it perched disintegrated, and was lying on its port side. One of Scorpion's running lights was in the open position, as if it had been on the surface at the time of the mishap, although it may have been left in the open position during the vessels recent night-time stop at Rota. One Trieste II pilot who dived on Scorpion said the shock of the implosion may have knocked the light into the open position. The secondary Navy investigation, using extensive photographic, video, and eyewitness inspections of the wreckage in 1969, offered the opinion that Scorpion's hull was crushed by implosion forces as it sank below crush depth. The Structural Analysis Group, which included Naval Ship Systems Command's Submarine Structures director Peter Palermo, plainly saw that the torpedo room was intact, though it had been pinched from the operations compartment by massive hydrostatic pressure. The operations compartment was largely obliterated by sea pressure and the engine room had telescoped 50 ft (15 m) forward into the hull by collapse pressure, when the cone-to-cylinder transition junction failed between the auxiliary machine space and the engine room.

The only damage to the torpedo room compartment appeared to be a hatch missing from the forward escape trunk. Palermo pointed out that this would have occurred when water pressure entered the torpedo room at the moment of implosion. Shortly after her sinking, the Navy assembled a Court of Inquiry to investigate the incident and to publish a report about the likely causes for the sinking. The court was presided over by Vice Admiral Bernard L. Austin, who had presided over the inquiry into the loss of Thresher. The panel's conclusions, first printed in 1968, were largely classified. At the time, the Navy quoted frequently from a portion of the 1968 report that said no one is likely ever to "conclusively" determine the cause of the loss. The Clinton administration declassified most of this report in 1993, and it was then that the public first learned that the panel considered that a possible cause was the malfunction of one of Scorpion's own torpedoes.
The U.S. Navy has acknowledged that it periodically visits the site to conduct testing for the release of nuclear materials from the nuclear reactor or the two nuclear weapons aboard her, and to determine whether the wreckage has been disturbed. The Navy has not released any information about the status of the wreckage, except for a few photographs taken of the wreckage in 1968, and again in 1985 by deep water submersibles. The Navy has also released information about the nuclear testing performed in and around the Scorpion site. The Navy reports no significant release of nuclear material from the sub. The 1985 photos were taken by a team of oceanographers working for the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. Navy has periodically monitored the environmental conditions of the site since the sinking and has reported the results in an annual public report on environmental monitoring for U.S. nuclear-powered ships and boats. The reports provide specifics on the environmental sampling of sediment, water, and marine life that is done to ascertain whether the submarine has significantly affected the deep-ocean environment. The reports also explain the methodology for conducting this deep sea monitoring from both surface vessels and submersibles. The monitoring data confirm that there has been no significant effect on the environment. The nuclear fuel aboard the submarine remains intact and no uranium in excess of levels expected from the fallout from past atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons has been detected by the Navy's inspections. In addition, Scorpion carried two nuclear-tipped Mark 45 anti-submarine torpedoes (ASTOR) when she was lost. The warheads of these torpedoes are part of the environmental concern. The most likely scenario is that the plutonium and uranium cores of these weapons corroded to a heavy, insoluble material soon after the sinking, and they remain at or close to their original location inside the torpedo room of the boat. If the corroded materials were released outside the submarine, their density and insolubility would cause them to settle into the sediment. The Navy has extensively investigated the loss of Scorpion through the initial court of inquiry and the 1970 and 1987 reviews by the Structural Analysis Group. Nothing in those investigations caused the Navy to change its conclusion that an unexplained catastrophic event occurred.

Theories about the loss:
The U.S. Navy's court of inquiry listed as one possibility the inadvertent activation of a battery-powered Mark 37 torpedo by stray voltage. This acoustic homing torpedo, in a fully ready condition and without a propeller guard, is believed by some to have started running within the tube. Released from the tube, the torpedo then somehow became fully armed and successfully engaged its nearest target: Scorpion. The 1970 Naval Ordnance Laboratory "Letter", the acoustics study of Scorpion destruction sounds by Price and Christian, was a supporting study within the SAG report. In its conclusions and recommendations section, the NOL acoustic study states: "The first Scorpion acoustic event was not caused by a large explosion, either internal or external to the hull. The probable depth of occurrence and the spectral characteristics of the signal support this. In fact, it is unlikely that any of the Scorpion acoustic events were caused by explosions."
A later theory was that a torpedo may have exploded in the tube, caused by an uncontrollable fire in the torpedo room. A likely cause could have been the overheating of a faulty battery. The Mark 46 silver-zinc battery used in the Mark 37 torpedo had a tendency to overheat, and in extreme cases could cause a fire that was strong enough to cause a low-order detonation of the warhead. If such a detonation had occurred, it might have opened the boat's large torpedo-loading hatch and caused Scorpion to flood and sink. In the mid-1990s, engineers testing Mark 46 batteries at Keyport, Washington, said the batteries leaked electrolyte and sometimes burned while outside their casings during lifetime shock, heat and cold testing.

During the 1968 inquiry, Vice Admiral Arnold F. Shade testified that he believed that a malfunction of the trash disposal unit (TDU) was the trigger for the disaster. Shade theorized that the sub was flooded when the TDU was operated at periscope depth and that other subsequent failures of material or personnel while dealing with the TDU-induced flooding led to the sub's demise. Retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Dave Oliver offers a convincing flow of logic that it was quite likely a hydrogen explosion, either during or immediately following a battery charge that destroyed USS Scorpion and killed her crew.
The results of the U.S. Navy's various investigations into the loss of Scorpion are inconclusive. While the court of inquiry never endorsed Dr. Craven's torpedo theory regarding the loss of Scorpion, its "findings of facts" released in 1993 carried Craven's torpedo theory at the head of a list of possible causes of Scorpion's loss. The photographic evidence suggests that the Scorpion's prop has been taken off by the Mk 37 which is exactly the way the Mk 37 and related Mk 46 torpedoes attack submarines: they home on the prop shaft and take it off with a small explosion. The issue is how the Mk 37 fired. The Navy's findings on the loss of Scorpion were inconclusive, however it was established with some confidence that the boat was lost due to an explosion in the forward compartment where the ship's battery well is located and while at or near periscope depth. Navy scientists who, in 1970, gave their opinion that the sub's hull was smashed by implosion damage and not a torpedo blast, a finding they support with their interpretation of certain evidence about the condition of the hull and hydro acoustic recordings of the disaster. The battery had a thin metal-foil barrier separating two types of volatile chemicals. When mixed slowly and in a controlled fashion, the chemicals generated heat and electricity, powering the motor that pushed the torpedo through the water. But vibrations normally experienced on a nuclear submarine were found to cause the thin foil barrier to break down, allowing the chemicals to interact intensely. This interaction generated excessive heat which, in tests, could readily have caused an inadvertent torpedo explosion. The main theory that the Russians sunk her in retaliation for the sinking of their sub K129 has been debunked due to there being no large explosions recorded.

ordered	31 Jan 1957	Displacement	2,880 long tons
Builder	General Dynamics Conn.	Length	76.8 meters (252 ft))
Laid down	20 Aug1958	Beam	9.7 meters (31 ft 10 in)
Launched	19 Dec1959	Draft	9.1 meters (29ft 10in)
Commissioned	29 Jul1960	Propulsion	S5W reactor
Class	Skipjack Submarine	Compliment	8 officers and 75 ratings
Armament	6 x 21in torpedo tubes	N tipped	2 x Mark 45 Torpedoes

Fate: Lost with crew of 99 on the 22May 1968. (cause- unknown)

Status: Located on seabed of the Atlantic Ocean in 3,000 meters of water 740 Km southwest of AZORES.

HAVE A LAUGH

Lost Words: Mergatroyd !

Do you remember that word? Would you believe the spell-checker did not recognize the word Mergatroyd? Heavens to Mergatroyd!

The other day a not so elderly (I say 75) lady said something to her son about driving a Jalopy; and he looked at her quizzically and said “What the heck is a Jalopy?" He never heard of the word jalopy!! She knew she was old.... But not that old.

Well, I hope you are Hunky Dory after you read this and chuckle.

About a month ago, I illuminated some old expressions that have become obsolete because of the inexorable march of technology. These phrases included: Don't touch that dial, Carbon copy, You sound like a broken record, and Hung out to dry.

Back in the olden days we had a lot of moxie. We'd put on our best bib and tucker, to straighten up and fly right.

Heavens to Betsy! Gee whillikers! Jumping Jehoshaphat! Holy moley!

We were in like Flynn and living the life of Riley; and even a regular guy couldn't accuse us of being a knucklehead, a nincompoop or a pill. Not for all the tea in China!

Back in the olden days, life used to be swell, but when's the last time anything was swell? Swell has gone the way of beehives, pageboys and the D.A.; of spats, knickers, fedoras, poodle skirts, saddle shoes, and pedal pushers.

Oh, my aching back! Kilroy was here, but he isn't anymore.

We wake up from what surely has been just a short nap, and before we can say, “Well, I'll be a monkey's uncle!” Or, “This is a fine kettle of fish!” We discover that the words we grew up with, the words that seemed omnipresent, as oxygen, have vanished with scarcely a notice from our tongues and our pens and our keyboards.

Poof, go the words of our youth, the words we've left behind. We blink, and they're gone. Where have all those great phrases gone?

Long gone: Pshaw, The milkman did it. Hey! It's your nickel. Don’t forget to pull the chain. Knee high to a grasshopper. Well, Fiddlesticks! Going like sixty. I'll see you in the funny papers. Don't take any wooden nickels. Wake up and smell the roses.

It turns out there are more of these lost words and expressions than Carter has liver pills. This can be disturbing stuff! (Carter’s Little Liver Pills are gone too!)

We of a certain age have been blessed to live in changeable times. For a child each new word is like a shiny toy, a toy that has no age. We at the other end of the chronological arc have the advantage of remembering there are words that once did not exist and there were words that once strutted their hour upon the earthly stage and now are heard no more, except in our collective memory. It's one of the greatest advantages of aging.

Leaves us to wonder where Superman will find a phone booth..

See ya later, alligator! Oki-doki.

WE ARE THE CHILDREN OF THE FABULOUS 50'S..NO ONE WILL EVER HAVE THAT OPPORTUNITY AGAIN...WE WERE GIVEN ONE OF OUR MOST PRECIOUS GIFTS: LIVING IN THE PEACEFUL AND COMFORTABLE TIMES, CREATED FOR US BY THE “GREATEST GENERATION!”

Royal Australian Navy - Ship History: HMAS Australia (II)

Class	County Class	Speed	31.5 knots
Type	Heavy Cruiser	crew	679 (peace) 848 (war)
Pennant	184/ D84/ C84	Machinery	Browns Curtis Turbines
Builder	John Brown & Co Scotland	Shafts	4
Laid down	26 August 1925	Horsepower	80,00 SHP
Launched	17 March 1927	Displacement	9,072 Tonnes
Commissioned	24 April 1928	Length	192.02 Metres
		Beam	20.83 Metres
		Draught	6.6 Metres
Armament	8 x 8in guns 8 x 4in guns 4 x 3 pounder guns		
Fate	Sold for scrap 25 January 1955		

HMAS *Australia* (II) was one of two 10,000 ton County Class heavy cruisers ordered by the Australian Government as part of a five year naval development program begun in 1924 and completed in 1929.

She was built to the Kent Class design of County Class cruisers, her sister ships being HMAS *Canberra* and HM Ships *Kent*, *Berwick*, *Cornwall*, *Cumberland* and *Suffolk.*
She commissioned at Clydebank on 24 April 1928, two months before her sister ship HMAS *Canberra*, under the command of Captain Francis HW Goolden RN. HM King George V visited *Australia* on the morning of 17 July and was received with a Royal Guard and Band. The King inspected the upper and main decks taking time to speak with a number of *Australia*'s ship's company.Following a period of trials *Australia* (II) departed Portsmouth on 3 August 1928 and proceeding via Montreal, Quebec, Halifax, Boston, New York, Annapolis, Kingston, Balboa, Tahiti, Wellington and Brisbane, reached Sydney on 23 October 1928.
She spent the first six years of her commission on the Australia Station, mostly in home waters. In 1932 she cruised to various Pacific Islands and in 1933 she visited New Zealand.

On 10 December 1934 she sailed for England, with His Royal Highness The Duke of Gloucester embarked, on exchange duty with the Royal Navy, her place on the Australia Station being taken by HMS Sussex. Proceeding via New Zealand, Fiji, Balboa and Kingston, *Australia* (II) reached Portsmouth on 28 March 1935.
In May 1935 *Australia* (II) proceeded to the Mediterranean where she served with the British forces until July 1936. She returned to England during the period of 21 June 1935 to 12 September 1935 to take part in the July Jubilee Review at Spithead. On 14 July 1936 she departed Alexandria to return to Australia via Aden and thence direct to Fremantle.
She arrived in Sydney on 11 August 1936 after an absence of 615 days on exchange service. Apart from a visit to Melbourne in November 1936, *Australia* (II) spent the remainder of the year at Sydney and Jervis Bay.



HMAS Australia transiting the Panama Canal in 1935

Australia (II) spent the first three months of 1937 in home waters and in April cruised to New Zealand visiting Wellington, Otago and Auckland. In July she proceeded on a northern cruise to Queensland ports, New Guinea and New Britain, returning to Sydney on 10 September. In November she made her annual visit to Melbourne, which, except for a brief cruise to Hobart in February 1938, brought her peace time seagoing activities to a close. She paid off into Reserve on 24 April 1938.

Australia (II) recommissioned at Sydney on 28 August 1939 under the command of Captain Robert R Stewart RN. The first nine months of World War II were spent on the Australian coast and on one occasion she investigated a doubtful report of an 'unknown raider'. Between May and July 1940 she was employed on convoy escort duties, initially between Fremantle and Capetown and later between Capetown and Freetown on the African west coast

As part of the Dakar Squadron in July 1940, *Australia* (II), in company with HM Ships *Hermes*, *Dorsetshire* and *Milford*, was patrolling off the French West African coast, observing the French fleet. During this month *Australia* (II) fired her first shot in World War II when she was attacked by an enemy bomber. On 9 July she joined a convoy for the United Kingdom and for the rest of the month she was patrolling off Norway in the vicinity of the Faeroes with the 1st Cruiser Squadron, at one time engaged in a search for the German battleship Gneisenau. The patrol continued throughout August.

September 1940 found *Australia* (II) involved in Operation MENACE and patrolling off Dakar, French West Africa, shadowing French cruisers Gloire, Montcalm and Georges Leygues. The object of Operation MENACE was to install General de Gaulle and a Free French force in Dakar thereby evicting the existing Vichy government and forestalling any possible German occupation.

The optimistic belief that the population of Dakar would welcome de Gaulle proved to be ill-founded and shore batteries opened fire on the fleet. *Australia* (II) escaped damage, but *Cumberland* and *Foresight* were both hit. *Australia* (II) with *Fury* and *Greyhound* attacked a French destroyer which was set ablaze from end to end. On the following day, 24 September, *Australia* (II) was engaged in a general fleet bombardment of French ships and forts and was twice subjected to high level bombing attacks by French planes. On 25 September *Australia* (II) and *Devonshire* moved in towards Dakar to attack French cruisers. During the engagement which followed *Australia* (II) received two hits aft and her Walrus spotting aircraft was shot down. Fifteen minutes after engaging the French ships the British cruisers withdrew. In 13 minutes *Australia* (II) had fired 15 salvoes.

In October 1940 *Australia* (II) was patrolling off the Azores and escorting troop ships between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom. On 29 October, in the Orkney/Shetland area, *Australia* (II) succeeded in rescuing nine crew members of a Sunderland Flying Boat, despite Force 10 winds and very high seas.

The remainder of 1940 was spent docked in Liverpool for a refit. During December the city was subjected to a period of heavy air raids. On one occasion a large bomb fell between the ship's side and the dock wall and incendiaries fell on board but were quickly extinguished. The catapult wire was damaged and square port windows in the Captain's cabin broken. The bombing proved too much for both ship's cats who deserted, and the ship's company apparently missed out on their Christmas poultry that year when the ducklings were incinerated in the contractor's premises which were burnt out.

After a period escorting convoys to Freetown, Durban, Suez and Colombo, *Australia* (II) finally arrived back in Sydney on 24 March 1941.

Between April and November the ship was on duty in the Indian Ocean and on 6 November carried out a reconnaissance of the Crozet Islands. She returned to Sydney in December and became Flagship of the Australian Squadron and two months later, in February 1942, Flagship of ANZAC Squadron, having Noumea as its operational base.
In March and April 1942 *Australia* (II) operated in the South West Pacific in support of United States naval forces attempting to halt further Japanese southward expansion. On 22 April the Naval Command in the South West Pacific Area was reorganised and renamed. ANZAC Squadron became Task Force 44 with *Australia* (II) as Flagship, and on 5 May Task Forces 11, 17 and 44 united as one, Task Force 17.
The Battle of the Coral Sea (7 May 1942) saw *Australia* (II) as Flagship of the Support Group (Task Group 17.3) attacking enemy transports and light cruisers reported to be heading for Port Moresby through Jomard Passage. The Support Group was attacked by eight torpedo bombers and nineteen high level bombers on this date.

On 7 August 1942 *Australia* (II) led the escort of nine transports and six store ships containing the forces for the landing at Guadalcanal. She remained in the area until the end of August 1942, during which period she was subjected, with the remainder of the forces, to frequent heavy air attacks.

The early months of 1943 were spent in support of the Coral Sea Group and patrolling the east coast of Australia. On 11 April *Australia* (II) received a report of a Japanese landing on the south east shore of the Gulf of Carpentaria. Although subsequent investigations proved negative, it appeared likely that the Japanese were either establishing fuel caches for submarines or aircraft or both, or landing small parties of men as commandos or coast watchers.
From November 1943 to September 1944, *Australia* (II) was involved in bombarding enemy held islands in the South West Pacific, prior to allied assaults, from Cape Gloucester in the New Britain area to Morotai in the Netherlands East Indies.
The Battle for Leyte Gulf
On 20 October 1944, General MacArthur's Philippines invasion force, comprising some 550 ships and covered by Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet, arrived off Leyte Island in the central Philippines.
Australia's contribution to this famous amphibious operation was Commodore John Collins' Task Force 74, including HMA Ships *Australia*, *Shropshire*, *Warramunga* and *Arunta* attached to the US Seventh Fleet. Also present were the Landing Ships Infantry (LSI) HMAS *Westralia*, *Manoora* and *Kanimbla* carrying troops of the US 21st Regimental Combat Team; the frigate *Gascoyne*, HDML *1074* and the auxiliaries *Bishopdale*, *Poyang*, *Yunnan* and *Mekur*.
By 09:00 on 20 October hundreds of small boats and destroyers headed for the beaches of Leyte, accompanied by a tremendous bombardment from the accompanying battleships and cruisers.

Australia and *Shropshire* passed through the battle line as the small boats approached and opened fire on assigned targets. At 10:00, after the landing, *Shropshire*, *Arunta* and *Warramunga* shelled set targets and carried out intermittent bombardments throughout the day.
The following morning at 06:05 HMAS *Australia* (II) was hit by a Japanese suicide aircraft. Australia's commanding officer, Captain Dechaineux and 29 other officers and ratings were killed or died of wounds and Commodore Collins and a further 64 were injured. Command of the Australian ships consequently passed to Captain RF Nicholls in *Shropshire*. Nicholls recalled the attack in the following report:

During the dawn stand-to, a low-flying aircraft approached from the land between Australia and Shropshire. It was taken under fire and retired to the westward. Observers in Shropshire report that the aircraft was hit and touched the water but recovered. It was then turned east again and although under heavy fire, passed up the port side of Australia and crashed into the foremast at 06:05. There was a large explosion and an intense fire was started in the air defence position and bridges. Type 273 radar hut and lantern fell on to the compass platform; both HA Directors and DCT [Director Control Tower] were put out of action and the port strut of the foremast was broken. The fire was brought under control very quickly and by 0635 the large quantity of wreckage on the compass platform and ADP had been cleared away. Commodore JA Collins suffered burns and wounds; Captain EFV Dechaineux and Commander JF Rayment were mortally wounded...

Whether this was the first deliberate kamikaze attack on an Allied ship remains the topic of debate.

After this action *Australia* (II) was escorted by HMAS *Warramunga* (I) to Manus Island and thence to Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides for repairs. Captain JM Armstrong, RAN, subsequently assumed command on 29 October.
By 5 January 1945 she was back in action in the Lingayen Gulf covering the allied invasion of Luzon Island. Here she was subjected to repeated suicide attacks, this time there was no doubt of the kamikaze nature of the Japanese planes. *Australia* (II) was hit on 5, 6, 8 and 9 January, losing 3 officers and 41 ratings killed and 1 officer and 68 ratings wounded. This was the ship's last action in World War II. After repairs in Sydney, *Australia* (II) sailed for the United Kingdom via the United States on 24 May 1945 for a major refit, arriving at Plymouth on 1 July. She was still in the United Kingdom at the end of the war.
After a somewhat leisurely voyage home via the Cape of Good Hope, *Australia* (II) arrived at Fremantle on 25 January 1946 and Sydney on 16 February where she paid off into Reserve.
Apart from a three month deployment in Far Eastern waters between September and November 1947, *Australia* (II) spent the next three and half years in home waters, paying a goodwill visit to New Zealand in March 1948 and a brief visit to New Guinea in 1949.

Australia (II) spent the last five years of her active commission as a training cruiser, visiting New Zealand on three occasions with the Australian Squadron, from 24 February to 31 March 1950, mid-September to 6 October 1952, and a brief visit in October 1953.

From 1 to 14 August 1950, *Australia* (II) was engaged in a mercy mission to the Australian Antarctic base at Heard Island where a member of the staff, Dr Serge Udovikoff, was ill. Apart from the uncomfortable conditions created by gale force winds that gusted up to 65 knots, sleet, snow and hail, the ship experienced feed water difficulties due to the increased prevalence of plankton in the sea. Use of ship's water was restricted to drinking and teeth cleaning and no one was allowed to wash. Weather conditions were no better when *Australia* (II) arrived at Heard Island, but when a reasonable break occurred the cutter was lowered and Dr Udovikoff eventually brought on board for the journey to Fremantle.

In May 1951 the Governor of New South Wales, Lieutenant General Sir John Northcott, was embarked for Jubilee celebrations at Lord Howe Island. In July of the same year the ship paid a brief visit to New Caledonia and also visited New Guinea, New Britain and the Solomon Islands. During her visit to the Solomon Islands a ceremony was held to commemorate the sinking of her sister ship, HMAS *Canberra,* on 9 August 1942 in the Battle of Savo Island. A wreath was laid by 31 year old Able Seaman Harold Watts, then serving in *Australia*, who as a young Ordinary Seaman had survived the sinking of the heavy cruiser in 1942.

In the final year of her career, *Australia* (II) was awarded the Duke of Gloucester's Cup and carried out both Royal and Vice Regal duties. When Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and His Royal Highness The Duke Of Edinburgh visited Australia in February and March 1954, formed part of the naval escort for the Royal Yacht *Gothic* and HMNZS *Black Prince*.

During the Royal Visit to North Queensland, Her Majesty and His Royal Highness visited *Australia* (II) for an hour. After all officers were presented, the ship's company marched past in single file and the Royal Party inspected and talked to 20 selected senior and 20 junior ratings.

On 4 May 1954 the Governor-General, Sir William Slim, Lady Slim and their staff were embarked for a voyage to the Coral Sea, the Great Barrier Reef and the Whitsunday Passage. *Australia* (II)'s 8-inch guns were fired for the last time on 6 May 1954 and 'possibly for the last time in any of the Queen's navies'. While in the Coral Sea, a disabled Dutch LCT was taken in tow for Cairns.

Australia (II) paid off for disposal on 31 August 1954, having steamed 477,301 miles in the period since August 1939. She was sold as scrap to British Iron and Steel Corporation (Salvage) Ltd on 25 January 1955. *Australia* (II) was towed from Sydney by the Dutch tug *Rode Zee* on 26 March 1955 and was broken up at the Thomas Ward Shipbreaking Yard at Barrow-in-Furness, England, between 1955 and 1957.

PICTURE FUNNIES